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This paper examines the effect of economic integration (EI) and political unity on             1
linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English language in Europe.              
Using a broad range of analytic approaches for examining the evolving linguistic            
situation and for assessing how strong the demand for a common language in Europe is,               
this paper shows that the current sociolinguistic transformation and the growing use of             
English as the language of choice are both strong effects and key indicators of the               
dynamic integration process. As I shall show in the following sections, linguistic analyses             
based on continent-wide patterns of second language acquisition and language use in            
different formal and informal contexts across Europe from 1950s to the present indicate             
the evolution of a dynamic, complex, and interesting linguistic pecking order in which             
English is increasingly assuming the role of the ‘integrating’ and functional language. 














1 ​Economic Integration (EI) here refers to the continuous removal of tariff and nontariff  restrictions among 
nations through economic policies and political agreements meant to bring about economies of scale, 
increased productivity, and lower prices;​ whereas European Integration is the whole process of not just 
economic integration but also the political, legal, cultural, social and sociolinguistic integrations of the 
participating countries either wholly (e.g. for Germany) or partially (e.g. as was for UK) in Europe.  
1 








1. European integration and the nature of behavior of behavior of sociocultural systems: a              
functionalist approach…………………………………………………….……………...11  
2. An overview of the evolution and structure of European integration: its determinants             
and indicators……………….…………………………….........……….…......................27  
PART TWO​:………………..….…...……....…………………………………………..49  
3. Effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in            
Europe.………………...………………………………….……………...........................49 
4. Effect of economic integration and political centralization on the functions and status             
of the English language in Europe………………….….……...........................................75      
Conclusion …………………………………………….………………...........................97 
A Postscript.…….…………………………...…………..………………….…………..117  
Notes………………………………………..……………………..............................…124 
Bibliography....................................................................................................................126 
Tables and figures...............................................................................................................*   2
 




Preface and Acknowledgements 
My interest on the topic of languages evolved naturally during many spirited classroom             
discussions with Professors both in the Department of Anthropology as well as in the              
Political Science Department here at Hunter and at Baruch College all of which helped              
nurtured my academic interest leading me to be convinced that learning and education is              
indeed a highly selective process and contestable enterprise. As I came to see it, the               
process involves deliberate choices on what material gets to be included, discussed,            
emphasized, and what gets ignored, played down or marked for exclusion – all for good               
reasons. During those class discussions and before narrowing down to this present topic             
on European integration and its sociolinguistic situation, I was interested in investigating            
one of three broad topic areas:  
● Egypt or Mesopotamia: which was the first to rise and why?  
● The Rise of the State and the Evolution of Monotheism (using Egypt as the case               
study), and  
● History and the Behavior of Power (showing how in history, culturally similar or             
different, leading nations applied their power).  
My hypotheses were: One/ it was Egypt which rose first before Mesopotamia (which I               
found out ran contrary to that of the views held by Professors like Greg. Johnson who                
was also Chair of the Department of Anthropology), Two/ the evolution of Monotheism             
mirrored the development of the State - at least for Egypt, and Three/ that the behavior of                 
politico-cultural power could be usefully compared to that of gravity, to be studied as              
such, and could be even regarded as independent of its possessors much as one would               
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talk of a person or nation as being possessed by power (the familiar phrases that ‘what                
goes up comes down’ or ‘history repeats itself’ are pertinent metaphors).  
It was incredibly satisfying thinking of the academic potentials and merits of these              
topics; and I still believe they are great topics awaiting serious attention. However, for              
their further consideration, I was ​unable to enlist the kind of interest and or support I felt I                  
needed either because I had failed to cultivate the student-faculty socializations at the             
time necessary for their enthusiastic participation or because the topics were just            
considered, again, too sensitive to delve into as my discussions with Professors like J.              
Brown on race matters, and Greg. Johnson on Mid-Eastern origins led me to believe.  
My fourth topic option was on the evolution of the European languages after having a                
lively discussion once with my former linguistics Prof. E. Bendix (now emeritus) on the              
subject of the origin of languages. Here too, judging from the discussions, I concluded              
that this research topic was also equally problematic as it was about the tracing of               
Indo-European languages that inevitably leads one on a sure path to their African roots              
according to a Graduate Seminar I took with Prof. Delgado on Paleoanthropology which             
asserts that Africa is humanity’s cradle (I remember writing: “The Problem of Modern             
Human Origins and Why it Matters” as one of my term papers discussing human origins).  
Finally, upon a reconsideration of that general topic on languages from a different              
angle, this present thesis and its multidisciplinary approach took shape - inspired by             
insights drawn from principles such as the 'uniformitarian principle' in geology that the             
natural forces or processes observable today are similar to those which shaped the past. In               
other words, studying this topic in a contemporary setting - the process and dynamics of               
4 
modern European integration - provided me a new testing ground to apply the same              
general principles, theories or insights I would have had to apply had I taken on the other                 
more historically situated topics. It also allowed me to use a methodological approach             
that is both diachronic and synchronic as it is theoretical and empirical.  
The thesis essentially sets out to investigate ‘culture changes’ in a macro and              
transformational context by shedding light on the interactive causal dynamics between           
the economic and political forces and the emerging sociolinguistic situation with the aim             
of applying that understanding to show further the type of interventionist policies that can              
be feasible, practical, or desirable in a multilingual European Union.  
I am therefore truly indebted to all those privileged and stimulating discussions of the               
Undergraduate or Graduate Seminars I participated. I am thankful to all the Professors of              
the departments of Anthropology and Political Science (and Sociology) who, in one way             
or another, have contributed in my academic life. I am also grateful to all the Professors                
and Graduate Advisors for their understanding and patience. I am particularly thankful to             
Prof. McGovern and Prof. Zarcadoolars of the Department of Anthropology for support            
and feedback on earlier drafts of this thesis. All opinions, facts, or errors expressed in this                
paper, written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts               







The impact of economic and political integration on linguistic diversity has stimulated an             
upsurge of recent research interest on the link between the two phenomena. This paper              
examines the cumulative effect of integration on linguistic diversity and the new            
functions and status of the English language within the European Union (EU), one of the               
most significant multi-issue developments still unfolding in Europe.  
The paper employs a wide range of analytic approaches showing the links between the               
economic, political, and sociolinguistic spheres and uses survey data analyses to assess            
the evolving linguistic situation in Europe and to what extent English is becoming the              
primary language of transnational communication for many EU citizens.  
By and large, the sociolinguistic evidence presented in this paper indicate that the              
harmonizing and homogenizing dynamics of the economic, political and social          
integration have a significant impact on sociolinguistic diversity as languages compete           
and complement one another and as English becomes the most commonly spoken foreign             
language at the expense of others. In the future, English will be the most used language                
for intra-EU-wide communications in which it performs the different roles and functions            
of a mother tongue for some, a regional language for many, and a lingua franca for most.                 
Consequently, when modeling the Continent’s evolving sociolinguistic trajectory, the         
most predictable in time will be the evolution of a linguistic pecking order, an increasing               
language convergence whereby languages become more similar to each other, and the            
emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of            
the broader macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Eur​ope. 
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Introduction 
Introduction to the content, scope and significance, and approaches and          
methodology.    
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest to understand better the forces that              
activate and shape economic integration, transform political structures and build new           
institutions with the aim of gaining insights and developing a useful explanation of the              
process. There is a considerable amount of attention being devoted particularly to the             
understanding of the profound development taking place in Europe in which established            
patterns of economic, political, and social structures are being constantly altered and            
reordered. Various analytic frameworks from different disciplinary perspectives have         
been developed over the past decades by economists, political scientists, sociologists,           
anthropologists , and others interested in European integration to assess the dynamics of            3
this process: its course, the consequences it generates, and how to respond to some of its                
adverse effects. Diverse studies commissioned by the European Commission,         
contributions cataloged in the ARENA working papers , as well as ones by individual             4
scholars, among others, represent this growing interest on the subject. This paper is             
therefore an attempt to study “culture” changes in its macro form which is, in the words                
of the anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832-1917), “​..that complex whole which includes           
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by              
man as a member of society”  ​ including language. 5
3 See Irene Bellier and Thomas M. Wilson (ed), (2000) on: The Anthropology of the European 




This paper reviews some of the theoretical conceptions and empirical findings often             
employed in the literature to examine aspects of the causal characteristics and functional             
mechanisms of the economic and political integration process (​the independent          
variable​) and its overall impact on the sociolinguistic situation (​the dependent variable​)            
in Europe. This is because, at a fundamental level, economic and political integration             
necessarily lead to cultural unity of sorts that generates an inviting environment for             
linguistic unity. This macro-causal, deterministic approach, follows the tradition of          
thought which asserts that there are crucial, difficult to measure factors that help regulate              
or guide man’s behavior in spite of his participation seemingly as a ‘free-agent.’             
Darwin’s theory that biological factors do act as the basis for what man can be or do and                  
what he cannot, Freud’s insight that subconscious activities of the human mind are             
responsible for much of man’s basic choices, decisions, and actions, Marx's           
understanding that economic forces are what serve as the superstructures affecting man’s            
political calculations, behavior and conditions, as well as Sapir-Whorf’s argument that           
meanings imposed by language significantly influence man’s thought, perceptions, and          
actions are some of the factors. 
In this paper, however, I shall examine European integration from the 1950s to the               
present to illustrate the interactive nature of the economic, political, and sociolinguistic            
spheres. This deserves examination because, the development not only better tests aspects            
of some prevailing theories in the social sciences, it also has the significance of being the                
first important test on new structures and institutions such as the EU set to transform               
and/or depart from the traditional nation-state system – thereby setting a precedent for             
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other regional or global integrations that is different from the very self-limiting            
characteristics of the nation-state. But I want to consider this question in a much broader               
and richer context by drawing on the anthropological, economic, as well as the political              
science approaches and insights on integration in order to avoid viewing it in too narrow               
and shallow a focus. From a theoretical standpoint, what is happening in Europe - the               
internal reorganization of society in which economic and political differences between           
nation-states are minimized through deeper and wider harmonization and collective          
external adaptation - is not surprising since it is broadly in accord with prevailing              
evolutionary theories on the nature of sociocultural systems according to which           
macro-scale structures are the emergent properties of micro-scale processes (White,          
1949, 1959, 1975; Johnson, 1982). Thus, the paper begins with a brief examination of the               
characteristics and behavior of sociocultural systems in general in order to more            
meaningfully situate European integration as an evolving functional system in which the            
interactive nature of its people, member states, and the emergent EU institutions are             
analogous to those of the parts, structures, and the whole of a fully functioning              
organizational system. As Lewis and Steinmo have noted (2007), “evolutionary theories           
begin with an understanding of change as being a ​simultaneously​ endogenous and            
exogenous process. Instead of seeing the process as one of fundamental stability (what             
political scientists and economists would call ‘equilibrium’) evolutionary theorists         
understand the world as a ​‘complex adaptive system​ .’” (the authors’ emphasis). 
I have organized the paper into an introduction, two main parts: Part One and Part                
Two, and the conclusion. Part One constitutes the foundation and addresses two            
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fundamental issues: theoretical orientation, framework, or methodology with a review of           
the literature on the general characteristics and behavior of sociocultural systems in            
section I and an overview of the evolution and structure of European integration in              
Section II. While Part Two constituting the socio-economic dimensions of language           
addresses two other main issues: evolution of linguistic diversity in Europe in Section III              
and the emerging status of English as the integrative and functional language for Europe              
in Section IV. And the conclusion, taking into consideration major current events such as              
the eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, in Section V.  
The analyses begin in Section II on the key links between the economic and the                
political spheres. It brings theory closer to data and further strengthens the reliability of              
the findings and conclusions in the sections that follow. The cumulative effect of the              
economic and political integration on the linguistic diversity using sociolinguistic data           
analyses derived mainly from the European Commission’s language survey services, the           
‘Eurobarometer,’ the ‘Eurostat’ and others is presented in section III. Following Crystal            6
(2003), Graddol (1997), and to some extent Phillipson (2003) and others, section IV             
examines the effect of the integration process on the functions and status of the English               
language. We apply the derived implications from Kachru’s concentric model on the            
functional uses of English to assess to what extent English is becoming the most widely               
used European language in Europe. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
6They are periodic public opinion surveys and data analyses in the countries of the EU, established by the 
European Commission, aimed at monitoring the development of public opinion among the EU population.  
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PART ONE: Section I 
European integration and the nature of behavior of sociocultural systems: a           
functionalist approach 
1.1 Evolution and culture change 
Some observers insist that European integration, when placed in its overall context,            
represents “one of the very few current situations in which the decomposition of old              
nations can be systematically analyzed within the framework of the evolution of a larger              
polity - a polity destined, perhaps, to develop into a nation of its own” (Haas, 2004:xxxi                
(1958)). That is, the evolution into a larger continent-wide political-economic and           
sociolinguistic single system with its own characteristics. However, in order to analyze            
the process showing how changes in one area are related to changes in other fields, we                
must start with systems in general which are similarly composed of interrelated,            
interacting, and interdependent kinds of parts or structures with complementary          
functions. In principle, systems are self-regulating entities possessing the following          
characteristics: among other things, (I) inner cohesion (II) greater coordination, and (III)            
functional harmony, between parts to ensure efficient functioning and dynamic stability           
of the overall system. A system has its parts, structures, institutions or spheres             
interrelated into patterned arrangements which determine, to a varying degree, the           
relative functions of individuals as well as that of the system itself. Moreover, complex              
systems have embedded subsystems in which the causal links between parts and whole or              
center and periphery are not only complex and indirect which render the interactive             
processes of mutual influence and feedback uneven, but the links may also be difficult to               
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identify, analyze or interpret. Generally, according to White (1959), systems can evolve            
only in their systemic forms adapting continually to their environment within           
self-sustained dynamic equilibria in which changes in one or more parts or levels impact              
the rest of the system. Furthermore, such systems also can evolve through the             
differentiation of functions and structures and can expand or collapse through dynamic            
processes which accelerate or inhibit system growth as reported by Johnson (1982).            
These essential and shared characteristics of systems taken together, interestingly, are           
also being exhibited by the evolving European Union system.  
 For instance, “If a system, biological or cultural, possesses energy resources           
beyond the necessity of merely maintaining the status quo, it will evolve, i.e., take steps               
to produce a more highly organized, more powerful system,” as White (1975:31) pointed             
out. That is, it shall evolve by means of “vertical cleavages” and “horizontal cleavages,”              
at least for sociocultural systems, corresponding to their depth and breadth according to             
Steward (1972:66). In other words, successful systems such as ‘free market democracies,’            
like biological species, expand while unsuccessful ones like Communism contract or die            
out following the principle that the most efficient or best adaptable have the best chance               
for further development or survival. It is also observed that sociocultural evolution, the             
term for how societies and cultures change over time consisting of selection from             
interacting ‘traditions,’ institutions, or systems in a given context, is a dynamic process             
akin to “natural selection” – the key mechanism in biological evolution. In other words,              
whereas biological evolution takes place through the ‘gene’ selection, cultural evolution           7
7 The unit of heredity that determines the basic characteristics of offsprings and is transferred from 
parent to offspring. 
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takes place with the help of the ‘meme’ - the mechanism by which behavior, style or idea                 
is spread in culture from person to person.  
The process seemingly operates ‘blindly’ according to random selection and hence            
ensures that evolutionary processes generally remain ‘neutral’ of rational design or           
purposeful action - implying that evolutionary change may not be a ‘goal’ or ‘progress’              
driven process after all - at least in the Darwinian sense. Stated differently in the words of                 
Deutsch (1988): 
Not all of the behavior of political leaders, interest groups, governments, and            
states is purposive. At all levels - among individuals, groups, and nations - the              
communication channels and messages directing them toward their goals are not           
the only ones that impinge on their behavior. Indeed, several goals and several             
streams of messages from both without and within, may be competing for the             
limited available communication channels and for the time and attention of           
decision makers. Some of these competing inputs may be relatively random; and            
all of them may increase the confusion within the decision-making system and the             
overload on its channels facilities, and personnel. This can result in making some             
part of its output relatively random, and hence cause the whole input-output cycle             
to be much less predictable in the distribution of its results. (p. 92) 
  
Furthermore, since evolutionary change is, moreover, a complex process and proceeds            
imperceptibly slowly, a useful distinction is often made between ‘micro-level evolution’           
which refers to the development of variation within the same kind and ‘macro-level             
evolution’ that refers to the development of one type of a different kind. Anthropologists              
generally consider such distinct forms of human society: bands, clans, chiefdoms,           
kingdoms, nations, and nation-states as instances of macro-level evolution which they           
point out developed both of size and complexity by means of “integration” - the              
progressive linking of existing structures and institutions into larger, interrelated and           
coherent organizations. The evolutionary process, in some cases, however, may be           
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regression or disintegration (“fission”) to an earlier type, a negative form of integration             8
(entropy). Contemporary analysts of political integration usually cite the dissolution of           
the Soviet Union as an instance of macro-level disintegration in which its nations, the              
subsystems, and the center could not evolve further or hold together in the face of               
pressing internal and external challenges that faced the system. Such dynamics of            
integration-disintegration, and hence a system’s evolutionary path, are aptly summarized          
by Olsen (2005): 
Most of the time, integration into a larger organized system competes with the             
desire for autonomy among the system's components. It is difficult to find and             
maintain a proper balance between system integration and sub-unit autonomy.          
System coordination and coherence tends to foster efforts to protect the identity            
and distinctive character of the components. Likewise, differentiation of         
subsystems and integration of each component, are likely to generate demands for            
system coordination and control, coherence and consistency. Processes of         
political integration, therefore, can trigger disintegration and processes of         
disintegration can trigger reintegration and coordination. Hence, all systems are          
facing the questions of how much and what forms of unity the components can              
tolerate and how much and what forms of diversity the systems can tolerate. (p. 4) 
  
Thus, in the evolution of the EU, for the most part, this tendency explains why the                 
nation-states of Europe while moving in the collective direction of integration in some             
respects are for preserving some aspects of their national autonomy at the same time. Yet,               
according to Johnson (1982: 396), “System disruption or simultaneous hierarchy          
development may not be the only alternatives available to deal with           
scalar-communications stress. If a problem is being generated by the presence of too             
many units in the system, it might be possible to make the operational size of these                
units… larger, and thus the number of units in the system smaller.” And some observers               
8 Napoleon Chagnon, in his study of the Yanomamo ‘tribes’ of South America mapped out such 
fissioning of villages.  
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of EI have viewed the nation-states in Europe as constituting too many units in need of                
further development, thus why “The Europe that gave birth to the idea of the nation-state               
appears to be well on the way to rejecting it in practice” in order to evolve (Lindberg,                 
1963:3).  
1.2 European integration and the evolutionary-functionalist approach  
The ‘emergence,’ or more correctly the evolution, of European integration has brought             
together sovereign nation-states into ‘ever closer union’ through a dynamic process of            
economic, political and social integration considered one of the most extraordinary           
phenomena in contemporary international politics or organizational studies, not the least           
because seemingly it is proceeding against the explanatory and predictive powers of the             
finest theories in social science literature. In some respects, the EU seems more like a               
traditional international organization; in other ways, it is closer to a Continent-wide            
confederal arrangement; and yet in many more aspects, it resembles and increasingly            
functions as a typical nation-state with other characteristics of an evolving supra-state            
that is poised to relieve its members of higher tasks. Accordingly, there are different              
ontological and epistemological approaches or orientations reflecting this - and various           
conceptual frameworks consistent with the underlying perception of the EU as unique,            
n-1 or a ​sui generis ​, have appeared with little agreement about its exact nature or its                9
future end stage (Rosamond, 2000).  
1.2.1 The statist, or ‘realist,’ approach vs. the evolutionary, or ‘neo-functionalist,’           
approach 
9  n-1 or ​sui generis ​ is sometimes used to describe the EU as a new and different type of 
organization that has no true precedents - for which some things are simply unique to itself and past 
experiences may not fully apply to it. 
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Consequently, theorists and empirical researchers often differ in their view of            
European integration: whether it should be treated as a process, a condition, or an              
outcome - leading to different theories, model analyses, and levels of analyses, etc. in the               
attempt to explain EI satisfactorily. In particular, two basic approaches have been            
employed by political scientists and economists in their analyses: (a) the statist, or             
‘realist,’ approach which emphasizes the centrality of states (the parts), why they            
cooperate, and how this shapes the integration process and (b) the evolutionary, or             
‘neo-functionalist,’ approach which privileges the role played by the EU’s own emergent,            
centralized institutions (the whole) and its increasing impact on the behavior of its             
Member States in which “The states themselves are changed as a result of their              
participation in European integration” (Sandholtz, 1996: 426). The latter regards          
integration as a top-down process while the former a bottom-up process - an important              
distinction when analyzing causality. The weakness of the statist, strictly          
intergovernmental approach, however, stems in part from the growing preeminence of the            
EU over its Member States on a range of vital issues.  
These broad scholarly strategies seek to examine the causal characteristics and            
mechanisms of the process of change in terms of two sets of factors frequently discussed               
in the relevant literature: namely, the “endogenous” factors that are determined by the             
integration system and the “exogenous” factors that are causally independent from the            
system’s internal variables such as the roles of NATO and globalization and their effects              
on European integration. Analysts who seek to explain EI within the ‘statist’ context are              
more likely to focus on the role played by the interacting endogenous factors and their               
16 
interconnectedness while those who seek to view the process from an evolutionary,            
global, context are more apt to recognize the role of external factors such as the               
transformative effects of modern transport-communications technologies as triggers and         
their subsequent impact on European integration. This suggests that the two approaches            
are not mutually exclusive but complementary and that EI could be better explained in              
terms of both sets of factors which are invariably interrelated whether they function as the               
antecedent, conditioning, intervening, dependent or independent variables and whether it          
is at the micro- or macro-levels. However, ‘exogenous shocks’ or factors such as             
Europe’s deep desire for independence from US influence, its fear of a potential future              
subordination to a more powerful China, and other advantages to be gained through             
collective action, all seem to explain better the macro-level strategies of European            
integration.  
1.2.2 ‘Unilinear evolution’ vs. ‘multilinear evolution’ 
Anthropologists, not surprisingly, also have two broad, similar approaches on how            
sociocultural systems, to which we include the EU, evolve, function, and are maintained:             
“unilinear evolution” and “multilinear evolution”. These approaches mainly deal with          
variability, change and continuity corresponding to the neofunctionalist and statist          
(intergovernmental) approaches respectively. The unilinear model pioneered by previous         
anthropologists such as Lewis H. Morgan (1818-1881) and Edward Tylor (1832-1917)           
posits that a sociocultural system evolves, in the sense that is presently applied to              
European integration, following the path of increase of size, greater complexity and the             
development of organizational hierarchy. It stresses the overall linear direction of human            
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history and emphasizes the essential and decisive role of technology in the development             
process - for “It is the technological sector of a cultural system that harnesses and puts to                 
use the energy necessary to the cultural system” (White, 1975:18). However, in the early              
20th century, a systematic critique and consequently a rejection of the uni-linearly            
deterministic approach was accompanied by the acceptance of the rather multi-linearly           
static evolutionary approach whose emphasis is based on cultural relativism. Cultural           
anthropologists, led by Franz Boas, operating under the principle of ‘data first, theories             
later’ criticized the unilinear evolutionary theorists for their simple-to-complex notion of           
evolution, for their failure to account satisfactorily the significant role of           
non-technological culture variables, and for their deep interest ‘in making          
generalizations’ at the expense of relevant specificities (Steward, 1955). ​Moreover, they           
objected to the claims that cultural changes are both progressive and directional, or that              
societies can be ranked on a single, linear scale of evolutionary complexity or worth; i.e.,               
such as ‘primitive’ or ‘underdeveloped’ social forms vs. ‘civilized’ or ‘advanced’           
societies. From the perspective of the multilinear model or cultural particularism, cultures            
are to be compared only relatively in accordance with their respective historical            
specificities. Consequently, according to this model, there is much more to cultural            
evolution and cultural variability than simply the one assigned to the role of technology              
in determining change. They argue, for example, different outcomes and variability could            
also be generated from identical background conditions simply when ideological          10
motives intervene. The 19th-century Manifest Destiny - a belief or doctrine that US             
10 Ideological motives derived from a collection of beliefs that are held by society or by an individual.  
18 
expansion throughout the Americas was inevitable and justified is an apt example. Thus,             
with a focus on cultural particularities between cultures and the role of the more fluid               
factor of human agency, this synchronically sensitive model sought to replace the            
deterministic trending of unilinear evolution in which the role of human agency in             
directing development takes the place of technological determinism.  
1.3 The resurgence of the technology-led model of change: economic determinism in            
social evolution 
By the 1940s, however, a second generation of anthropologists lead by Leslie White              
(1949, 1959, and 1975) sought to revive the earlier unilinear and diachronic model by              
increasingly relying also on empirical evidence with emphasis on the interrelationships           
between the state of technological systems and the other subsystems of culture. From the              
perspective of this model, a sociocultural system can, in fact, be distinguished from             
others by its unique technological base reflected in the patterns of its economic             
subsistence, political organization, and social institutions. According to this refined          
model, the economic sphere within which the technologic component is integral           
subordinates all other subsystems within the system in terms of dynamic causal relations             
and that development in technology inevitably lead to further evolution of sociopolitical            
organization of a culture. That is, changes brought about by the operation of new              
technologies must be accompanied by changes in the other aspects of society since an              
organic whole must develop at relative structural-functional equilibrium. Moreover, the          
model disputed the assertion that cultural variations merely reflect differences in           
environmental, human, or ideological factors, arguing that there is a strong deterministic            
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relationship between all the components or spheres of a sociocultural system. 
As White (1975) argues, different cultures are characterized not only by different             
levels and forms of development and sophistication, they can be explained better by             
reference to the determining technological variables rather than specifics of the           
conditioning geographical environments or human factors. White’s (1949) analysis of the           
evolution of culture, “from Anthropoid society to Human society” with emphasis on the             
role of the economic sphere, strongly emphasized that the technological contribution to            
the development process of sociocultural systems has been quite significant and this, he             
argues, undermines the claims of historical particularism. For him, the discovery and/or            
invention of distinct technologies were noticeably accompanied not only by greater           
harnessing of energy but also by higher forms of social organization and complexity:             
from the band level of hunters and gatherers, the nation-state system of modern society,              
to the emergence of further unions of the nation-states. This conclusion, prima facie,             
admittedly maintains a linear sequence of evolution along which all cultural systems,            
though obviously at uneven rates and different periods, presumably progressed - just as             
rejected by the multilinear model.  
In White’s view, a sociocultural system evolves in the direction of greater            
complexity in proportion to the level of technology at hand, according to rules inherent to               
culture itself. His evolutionary theory of culture focuses on the relationships between            
technology (the primary means), the harnessing of energy, ‘the active agent,’ and the             
overall development of culture (White, 1975:376). In empirical terms, he states that the             
degree of cultural development, and thus differences between cultures, can be explained            
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using a E x T x V = P formula, in which E, T, and P have (positive) values where E is the                       
energy factor or variable, T the technology/tool factor, V for the environment, and P the               
total product or degree of cultural development. With that, White (1959: 49) formalized a              
culture growth model to estimate the relative contribution of each variable that enables             
comparison between different cultures. Thus, cultures will vary as the determining           
variable, T, varies and it is this which he claimed directly determines cultural variability              
both diachronically and synchronically rather than the environmental V factor which he            
regards to be a constant variable. 
 His model, thus views the role of technology, whether in Ancient Egypt or the              
European Union, as the prime mover in the change process; it views a wide range of                
phenomena such as sociopolitical setups and the functions of languages in society as             
being shaped by the operating imperatives of changes brought by technology and places             
purposeful human action and the intervening social arrangements as secondary. It is in             
short a 'technology-led' model which regards decisive changes in new technologies as the             
essential instruments of change at every level of society. And, it is from this perspective               
that the role of advanced modern technologies such as air, sea, and land transport and               
communication systems like telephone, radio, TV, internet, etc. get causal priority in the             
transformation of Europe. For it is these technologies which have made European            
integration entirely feasible through the fundamental changes brought on the functioning           
of nation-states and the interactions of their languages.  
 But more significantly, White (1975) also asserts that technologies and some of            
their applications may develop independently from purposeful concerns, setting out on           
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lives of their own acting to regulate sociopolitical activity and its meaning. This view is               
consistent with the core hypotheses of evolutionary theory and the law of unintended             
consequences. It not only suggests that sociopolitical behavior has strong technologically           
determined sociopolitical correlates, but it also poses new questions about the extent to             
which ‘purposeful actors’ play a role in determining the forces of change. As he argues,               
“It is not a changing sentiment that turns the wheels of social evolution. Rather, it is the                 
alteration of social and political groupings by the operation of technological forces that             
determines the direction and scope of the sentiment” (White, 1959: 26). In other words, it               
is the advancement of the technological “forces that made small political units obsolete             
and their amalgamation inevitable;” not the mere visions of statesmen (White, 1959: 26).             
However, others have suggested that the technology component and the economic sector            
are relevant though they may not perform the determining role in development processes             
quite independent of the other factors. 
1.4 An alternative model of change: ‘organizational structure and scalar stress.’ 
An alternative approach to sociopolitical and organizational change has argued          
that in complex organizations or sociocultural systems, other factors such as different            
modes of organizing a system, policies, human values which may be less dependent on              
the role of technology may influence, if not determine, the direction, processes, and             
structures within which change takes place. In particular, Johnson’s (1982) ‘organization           
structure and scalar stress’ model, which considered both ‘small-group’ as well as            
‘large-scale’ dynamics, focuses on demographic growth, organizational and structural         
changes, etc. as underlying factors which affect sociopolitical evolution and under what            
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conditions, system’s growth or evolution might falter. It regards the development of            
communication technologies such as writing as responsive mechanisms designed to meet           
the needs of administrative and control functions. It is a ‘technology demand-pull' model             
in sharp contrast to the ‘technology-led’ model: in the former, technology facilitates            
cultural progress, in the latter it determines progress. In this ‘technology demand-pull'            
sense, technologies act like biological mutants: they ‘emerged’ (are invented) only to            
meet the demand of a selective pressure or ‘scalar stress’ rather than being created to               
bring about desired changes. 
 Johnson (1988) applied the concept of “scalar stress” largely as an           
empirical-analytic technique to show the interrelations between population size,         
organizational complexity, political structure, scalar stress, the development of new          
technology, and the evolution of social systems. He defined organizational performance           
which is at the root of change in his model as load/capacity; and like White (1959), he                 
formalized ‘scalar stress’ as (n-squared - n)/2 where n = the number of units in the                
organization system (such as the number of nation-states within the EU (28)). As he              
shows, technological innovations, though can help the development process in reducing           
scalar-related stresses on existing structures and processes - by increasing the number of             
information channels between center and periphery, or making the operational size of            
units larger by means of integration and, thus, the number of units in the system smaller,                
could increase performance in an evolutionary way (Johnson, 1982:396). That is, an            
organization or system could evolve ‘sequential hierarchies’ in which case it has simply             
‘reorganized’ itself without significant changes in technology. For example, instead of           
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organizing a, b, c, d together in one group in abcd, they could be reorganized into various                 
forms such as: ac, ad, dc, cb, etc. which would essentially not only change form but also                 
meaning and performance, among other things. The ‘multi-speed’ form of differentiated           
integration adopted by the EU on the basis of similar organizational models allows             
common objectives to be pursued first by a group of member states both willing and able                
to proceed in a chosen area such as in the single currency, and Schengen area with the                 
implication others will follow later when ready and able.  
His analysis based on very diverse datasets obtained from different social science             
literature on various group dynamics shows that simply by restructuring the size of             
operational units within an organization, the ability to process and monitor information in             
decision-making contexts would be increased. This means by simply restructuring its           
organization with just the right ideas it would be possible to bring significant, to be sure                
endogenous, changes within a system. Thus, as Steward (1972: 21) puts it, “There are              
certain problems in which man’s rational and emotional potentials are not a zero factor in               
the equation.” ​And as some anthropologists, Shore and Wright (1997 have further            
observed, governing policies can be viewed as "political technologies" that are useful            
instruments for ordering society or organizations.  
1.5 Multi-causation and economic primacy 
 Admittedly, these arguments suggest a lack of general consensus on the relative            
weight of causal factors on the evolution of sociocultural systems leading some analysts             
to argue for a “multicausal view” of reciprocal causation between variables, suggesting            
that the issue of causality in developed systems is just too complex to be captured by a                 
single theoretical model or to be determined by one main factor. In fact, the issue on the                 
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relative roles of technology vs. organizational style and ideas, the economic vs. the             
political, and nature vs. nurture, in determining change of any system has been a subject               
of ongoing scholarly debate with no single acceptable answer at present and remains one              
of the most difficult to resolve within social science. 
 These arguments and the lack of a clear-cut consensus regarding causation           
notwithstanding, the models and overall approach in this paper on social evolution with             
particular pertinence to European integration follow the “economic relevance” view of           
Moravcsik (1998) according to which:  
Economic interests remained primary. Pressures from economic interest groups         
generally imposed tighter constraints on policy than did security concerns and the            
ideological visions of politicians and public opinion. When one factor had to give             
way, it tended to be geopolitics. Economic interests, moreover, determine the           
circumstances under which geopolitical ideology could influence policy. Only         
where economic interests are weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national          
politicians indulge the temptation to consider geopolitical goals. (p. 6-7)  
 
This approach enables us to accept White’s deterministic model and use its derived              
implications to assess the economic and political determinants of European integration           
and its impact on the more conservative and reactive sociolinguistic area. 
 In spite of these insights and the progress made in understanding the evolution             
and functioning of sociocultural systems outlined above, the link between economic and            
political integration and its overall effect on linguistic situations remains a relatively            
unexplored area of research. In this paper, following these insights, approaches, and using             
sociolinguistic data analyses, I shall explore how and to what extent increased economic             
and political integration within a highly open and pluralistic society impacts linguistic            
diversity and how this is creating an unusual linguistic situation in Europe. 
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S​ection II, therefore, presents an overview of the evolution and structure of European              
Integration step by step showing the dynamic causal links between the economic and             
political spheres. It also examines how the economic-political integration extends to the            
sociocultural area through the spillover process mechanism. ​In this context, ​section I            
serves as the necessary theoretical foundations connecting sections II on economic and            


















PART ONE: Section II 
An overview of the evolution and structure of European integration: its           
determinants and indicators 
German aggression was a particularly vicious      
outgrowth of a bad general system, and only a         
radical and general change of the system of itself         
will provide continuous security for all. (David       
Mitrany, 1966)  
 
By pooling basic production and by creating a new         
high authority whose decisions will be binding on        
France, Germany and the other countries who may        
subsequently join, this proposal will create the first        
concrete foundation for a European federation      
which is so indispensable for the preservation of        
peace.  (Robert Schuman, 1950)  
  
According to Marx and Lenin, as well as to J. A.           
Hobson and Charles A. Beard, we ought to expect         
economic class or group interests to be decisive, but         
the evidence suggests a far more complex picture.        
(Deutsch, 1988) 
  
Our concern will be with the political ​consequences        
of economic integration (Lindberg, 1963) 
 
2.1 Economic and political integration as basis for corresponding  sociocultural and 
sociolinguistic integration 
 
This section outlines an overview of the link between the economic and the political              
spheres as the basis for the cultural and social integration and deals primarily with the               
nature of their relationships according to the referenced theories and or models in the              
previous section. That is, the evolutionary theory or systemic framework, the economic            
primacy thesis, the neofunctionalist theory, and the spillover thesis as they relate to the              
evolution, development and functioning of the EU system and process by applying            
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Burchill’s six criteria against which theories are generally evaluated on: 
● a theory’s ​understanding ​ of an issue or process, 
● a theory’s explanatory power of the theory, 
● the theory’s success at ​predicting​  events, 
● the theory’s intellectual ​consistency​  and ​coherence​ , 
● the ​scope​  of the theory, and  
● the theory’s capacity for ​critical self-reflection and intellectual ​engagement with          
contending theories. ​(Burchill, 1996: 24, emphasis in original) 
 
Since at a fundamental level, ​economic and political integration necessarily leads to             
‘cultural integration’ of sorts that generates an inviting environment for sociolinguistic           
unity​ , ​I intend to show here how the macro co-variables - the economic and the political                
arenas - correlate, influence, and affect each other in a dynamic way. Having shown this               
in this section II, Sections III and IV complete the paper by showing that this               
'economic-political' integration has also ‘spilled over’ into the sociolinguistic area (or           
cultural sphere) with various effects and reactions. Section III, therefore, looks at these             
cumulative effects on linguistic diversity in Europe which is simply another way of             
saying the next section examines the extent to which linguistic integration, or the             
linguistic situation, responds or reacts as the cultural correlate alongside developments           
within the economic and political areas as described in this section.  
2.2 ​ ​ Motivations and formalization  
Up to 1951, motivation in a European Integration (EI) process project was for              11
whatever the ‘founders’ said it is:   12
11 ​Two essential concepts are​ ​integration​  and ​process​ .  
12"Standing up to USA and Japan" is a far above-average reason for "hope" among the French (44 % :                   
second rank there). It was France alone among EC member states which pressed for counter-sanctions               
rather than continued negotiations when the United States threatened trade war against the Community over               
the GATT oilseeds dispute in November 1992.”  (Source: EUROBAROMETER 38, 1992)  
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● peace, security, prosperity, freedom,  
● ‘an ever closer union,’  
● restoring European influence in the world,  
● and more specifically the anchoring of Germany into binding post-war European           
institutions, etc.  
The decision by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to            
sign the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty on April 18, 1951, brought              
about the initial formalization of what has become the dynamic EI process. The Treaty              
entered into force on July 27, 1952. This development has had its necessary corollary,              
and there is evidence economies of scale derived from the ECSC have had beneficial              
effects for the rest of the integrated six-nation economies. Although the observed growth             
rates varied widely among each of the common market products, the overall performance             
by the whole sector was significant. From 1952 to 1956, with a limited but well-defined               
agenda, yearly economic growth among the member countries increased noticeably in all            
the ECSC products; the production of coal, iron ore, crude steel, and scrap increased by               
4, 22, 31, and 12-18 per cents respectively, according to Haas (2004: 67) . The sharp               13
increase in the volume of trade within the ECSC countries in the commodities under              
review during the period from 1952 to 1955 reflect this success: trade in coal grew to                
140, iron ore to 137, steel products to 251, and scrap to 457 (1952 = 100). As noted by                   
Haas (2004: 63), “The volume of trade in ECSC products rose by 93 per cent between                
1952 and 1955, while the increase in trade in all other sectors liberalized under the OEEC                
13 Originally published by Stanford University Press in 1958. 
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code, but not under the common market, amounted to only 59 per cent in the same                
period”, suggesting further growth could be generated by the addition of cognate sectors             
through expansion of the common market. Statistically, these are meaningful results as            
they are consistent with the logic or intended effect of market integration and spillover              
effects. The implication of this sector-to-sector, sector-to-economy, and        
economy-to-economy growth relationships in the context of one of the key questions            
being addressed in this paper is that there appears to be a significant link between the                
ECSC sector performance, economic growth of its member states, and the overall            
evolution of the integration process as caused by “the growth of capital interpenetration             
inside the Common Market” according to Mandel (1967:31). In other words, as predicted             
by the ‘neofunctionalist theory.’  
2.3 The neofunctionalist theory and economic primacy 
It is a theory of regional integration developed in the mid-1950s as an approach to the                 
integration of individual sectors mainly within the economic sphere at first with            
expectations of achieving spillover effects to other areas that further the process by which              
countries additionally remove barriers to free trade and other forms of interactions            
employing formal treaties.  
Haas (1958), Deutsch (1963), and to some extent Lindberg (1963) pioneered the study              
of European integration which focused on the performance and integrative mechanism of            
the ECSC. Their work at the beginning of the 1950s used the ECSC as a case study in                  
analyzing the processes and mechanisms of economic integration occurring across state           
boundaries which, in their view, would lead to the uniting of Europe. In Haas (1958), he                
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argued, based on his observations, the growth of the integration process was driven by a               
positive spillover mechanism between related sectors arising as a consequence of modest            
economic integration in initial sectors. According to him, “Converging economic goals           
embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe provided            
the crucial impetus. ​The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist,           
and trade unionist advanced the movement not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the              
writer.” (Haas, 1968: xix, emphasis added). Haas (1958) used a deterministic trending            
approach in his analysis which implies once the initial political decision is made on              
economic integration, such as the one exercised by the leadership of Jean Monnet, Robert              
Schuman and others on the creation of the ECSC, continued automatic economic            
leakages and linkages between ‘cognate’ sectors would ensure the rest of the process.             
Under this assumption, he contended this development process would be path-dependent           
as integration in one sector creates pressure as well as the condition for further integration               
in related sectors as a result of new demands and presumably the need to maintain overall                
structural equilibrium within the overall system. He also maintained that the process was             
inherently expansive and that it would lead to ‘the eventual loss of the individual identity               
of the ECSC through its absorption into what became the new European Community.’             
The ECSC has since lost its identity into what became the EU which is still expanding                
and evolving, composed of such bodies and institutions as the European Commission,            
Parliament, Council, and the Court of Justice. Their studies involved applying statistical            
as well as qualitative analyses on a variety of integration variables seeking to demonstrate              
a positive correlation between sector performance, economic growth, and the further           
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development of the overall process. While they all agreed on the logic of integration,              
Haas view of the process was that economic considerations were the driven force             
whereas for Lindberg (1963), it was more of a political process that involve public              
feedback, actor-socialization, and side-payments. That is, in order to get the process            
function and move forward, one must get the support of as many individual             
decision-makers and groups as have vested interests in the outcomes. Meaning, the            
process was, for the most part, due to processes of political feedback or responses to               
political problems. As Deutsch (1988) who treated the EC as an example of regional              
integration puts it, 
Feedback signals, we have said, may be used to bring about an increase or a               
decrease in the intensity and/or frequency of the original behavior that gave rise to              
them. If the feedback always ​increases the intensity and/or the frequency of the             
original behavior, then it is called ​positive or amplifying feedback;​ and it will             
drive the original behavior of the system higher and higher until some element in              
the system or in its environment breaks down, or until some essential resource or              
supply is exhausted. (p. 90) 
 
In fact, according to him (1988), the “Feedback works in cycles: from ​action to ​echo (that                
is, to the return of messages about the results of that action), and then from echo to                 
reaction​ (that is - as the next step - either to a repetition of the original action or to an                    
action at least somewhat different from the original)” (p. 90). 
Haas methodology and the validity of some of their assumptions have been disputed              
on several grounds, however. In particular, Hoffmann (1966) criticized the general           
problem arising from modeling the sector-by-sector integration deterministically which         
he argues was rather driven by individual state interest considerations. Moreover, Pollack            
(1997) and Moravcsik (1998) noted the importance of this bias not only in the original               
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model’s lack of emphasis on the primary role played by the states in initiating the               
direction and pace of the integration process but also the influence exerted by other              
domestic actors on the process. Furthermore, as Moravcsik argues, contrary to Haas            
expectations, European integration appeared to strengthen the nation-states, not weaken          
them, and any power delegated at the supranational level results from deliberate decisions             
by national governments in a principal-agent context where the States act as the             
principals. His “... contention is that major integration decisions- and multilateral           
negotiations over international cooperation more generally - are better explained with           
more narrowly focused yet more broadly generalizable ‘mid-range’ theories of economic           
interest, bargaining, and institutional choice drawn from the general literature on           
international cooperation” (Moravcsik, 1998:19). More significantly, Holland (1980)        
pointed out their studies failure to place the neofunctionalist analysis within the narrow             14
context of Western European particular experience and questioned their generalization          
and predictive validity. He argues EI may be unique, a ​sui generis​ , to the Western               
European economic, political, and cultural experience and hence incapable of fully           
describing the processes of regional integrations in general. Furthermore, he points out            
under the process the assumption of economic growth through spillover as ‘linear,            
smooth and homogeneous, rather than staggered, uneven, highly diverse and          
differentiated’ on a range of areas may be an unrealistic depiction of the actual process               
and consequently, the Haas deterministic model could not be valid. 
2.4 ‘Spillover’ and the other ‘spill-’ concepts 
14 A perspective that past integration drives the whole integration process. 
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Schmitter (1971), Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998), Haas (2004), and others            
subsequently tried to address some of the criticisms and shortcomings inherent in the             
original approach by taking into account not only the crucial role played by States as               
insisted by the Intergovernmental analysts but also the impact of other intermediaries and             
non-state domestic actors. In its most general formulation, according to Lindberg           
(1963:10), “‘spill-over’ refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific               
goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further                
actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.”                 
The theoretical underpinnings of the original neo-functionalist model as outlined by Haas            
himself “assumed that integration would proceed quasi-automatically as demands for          
additional central services intensified because the central institutions proved unable to           
satisfy the demands of their new clients. Thus, activities associated with sectors            
integrated initially would ‘spill over’ into neighboring sectors not yet integrated, but now             
becoming the focus of demands for more integration” (2004: xv). His model conceived of              
the spillover process as being limited mainly to the economic sectors but postulated an              
eventual Europe-level macro-polity outcome, nevertheless. It envisioned the continuing         
rise of new central institutions whose function would be to harmonize, homogenize,            
standardize and coordinate macro-policy differences among the member states, a process           
which would also simultaneously and gradually weaken the European nation-state          
system. 
This concept of micro-spillover which is within cognate sectors and macro-spillover is             
is between the economic and political spheres, while remaining the key aspect of the              
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model of integration as formerly devised by Haas and the neofunctionalist school, has             
since been refined to incorporate additional strategies of integration to account for the             
uneven processes of ‘spill-back’, ‘spill-around’, ‘encapsulation’ (‘the inclusion of one          
thing within another thing so that the included thing is not apparent’) (Schmitter,             
1971:242), and the growth of further unintended developments to better reflect the            
complexity and multi-process and multi-level dynamics which have significantly         
transformed European economic integration into a political union, the EU (Sandholtz,           
and Sweet Stone, 1998). Rosamond (2000) sums up the basic neo-functionalist reasoning,            
logic, or argument like this:  
Two or more countries agree to work for integration in a given economic sector              
(sector a). To accomplish this task more effectively, they agree to appoint a             
supranational bureaucracy - a ‘high authority’ to use the parlance of the time - to               
oversee operations. While the integration of sector a achieves some of the            
supposed benefits, the full advantage of integration will not be achieved unless            
cognate economic sectors are also drawn into the integrative web. In any case, the              
integration of a creates functional linkage pressures for related sectors b and c to              
become part of the game. There are two other more or less automatic processes in               
the neofunctionalist model. First, economic integration automatically generates an         
increased level of transactions between actors within the integrating region.          
Second, as we have seen, because of the essential group characteristic of politics,             
there is a tendency for new interest organizations to form at the regional level.              
This is particularly true of producer groups… whose interests shift (and indeed            
arise) as new levels of integration are accomplished. Meanwhile, the high           
authority becomes a key sponsor of further integration. Thus, it develops           
strategies (corresponding to its own emerging interests) to accomplish the twin           
goals of deeper economic integration in an expanding range of economic sectors            
and the increased institutionalization of authority at the regional level. To some            
extent, the high authority achieves this by acting as a constant advocate of the              
advantages of integration and by pointing to the relationships that exist between            
sectors a, b and c. (p. 58)  
 
This review of the spillover mechanism is consistent with the generalizations offered by             
Haas and others and shows that while it depends on prior intergovernmental bargains,             
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once a decision is made, it functions on a logic of its own. 
It is the key theoretical innovation forming the basis of the revised neo-functionalist              
model which admittedly demonstrates spillovers are apt to follow quite variable paths            
within a diverse, multi-path, multi-level, complex system. Thus, through the spillover           
dynamics of integration, “In Europe, what began as piecemeal problem-solving for the            
member states - underpinned by the peace motive - has ended up in a supranational order                
subjecting the constituent parts to collectively binding decisions” (Eriksen, 2010:10). It           15
shows that the systemic crisis the process experienced in the mid-1960s - as well as the                
current Europe-wide refugee crisis - was and is, rather than disproving the deterministic             
theory of spillover, merely the result of the punctuated counter-actions of the logic of              
integration in some areas with that of the logic of diversity as indicated by divergent               
national preferences on almost everything else.  
2.5 An interactive timeline of macro-spillover process in the form of ‘this then that,              
that then this…’ 
In spite of the complex, uneven, and slow pace of the integration process, the overall                
developments following the initial, positive performance of the ECSC suggest Haas’           
model could not be rejected. On the contrary, a short survey of the growth of additional                
treaties (or credible commitments) and mechanisms to further the process shows that the             
basic spillover thesis remained by and large valid and consistent with much of what Haas               
had predicted. Two additional Treaties: the European Economic Community (EEC) or           
‘Common Market’, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) establishing          
15 David Mitrany (1888-1975) saw that part of the root of international conflict was due the division of the 
world, and Europe in particular, into competing and rival political units. 
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further economic integration were signed on March 25, 1957. They entered into force on              
January 1, 1958. In sharp contrast to the limited agenda of the ECSC, the EEC had                
additional regulatory powers together with the authority to define the future order of             
things, marking the first step toward the emergence of a self-regulating and self-directing             
European polity - one which, instead of being dictated by individual national interests             
would direct their collective interests. This necessitated the establishment of new           
Europe-level institutions and brought about a dynamic process of decision-making          
innovations which have increasingly led and transformed the EI regime into ‘an ever             
closer union.’ On January 14, 1962, bolstered by past successes, prospect for further             
economic growth, and additional memberships, which is now at 28 strong member states             
providing greater economies of scale, the scope of integration was expanded to include             
other key sectors under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Single Customs            
Union (SCU) which was completed on July 1, 1968, 18 months ahead of schedule. In               
1986 the Single European Act (SEA), a major reform of the Rome Treaty (1958),              
providing an extra basis for the establishment of the ‘Single Market’ is signed.             
Completed in 1993, it amended the rules governing the functioning of the European             
institutions and expanded the Central powers adding new momentum to the integration            
process. 
2.6 Treaty on the European Union, and introduction of the Euro 
Furthermore, the ‘Maastricht’ Treaty on the European Union signed in 1991 created             
the single European currency, the euro, and the European Union. It opened the way for               
increased political integration and European citizenship and represented a new stage in            
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European integration. Also, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 extended the scope             
of co-decision making between the EU and its member states which reformed the pillars              
on foreign policy, justice, and home affairs further thereby closing the gap between             
economic integration and political cooperation. The treaty also introduced a High           
Representative who, together with the Presidents of the European Commission and the            
Council, provides a unified EU foreign policy, face, and voice, to the rest of the world.                
And the Lisbon Treaty, drafted as a replacement for the Constitutional Treaty and signed              
in 2007, aimed at increasing the coherency and consistency of the EU's external actions              
while streamlining the system’s decision-making structures. It clarified which powers          
belong to the member states, which ones belong to the EU and those that are shared                
between the two - through the principle of subsidiarity.  
Collectively, these series of treaties showing the gradual growth of the integration             
process demonstrates more significantly the formal macro-spillover from the economic          
sphere to the political one as envisaged by Haas and defined by Lindberg (1963):  
Political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability             
to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking            
instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new             
central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct            
settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new             
center. (p. 6) 
 
In fact, Lindberg's definition was simply a restatement of Haas formulations (2004)            
according to which “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national            
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards            
a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing            
national states” (p.16). 
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2.7 The Schengen Agreement as spillover into labor, sociocultural, and language           
issues  
Furthermore, the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985, the parallel form of social             
integration comparable to the economic and political integrations initially created          
independently of the European Union but now incorporated into it, aimed for much of the               
gradual abolition of border controls between member states. As a result, the agreement             
has increased people's, socioeconomic and cultural interactions between Europeans. And          
while for the most part the series of treaties before 1985 were notably designed to address                
and smooth the progress of the economic and/or political integration, the Schengen            
Agreement, in particular, marked the first formalization of the macro-spillover into the            
sociocultural domain, a spillover whose effect we will look at closely in the next sections               
as it relates to issues of European citizen interactions, linguistic diversity, communication            
and mutual intelligibility, and the need for a common language for Europe. It             
demonstrates relationships between the integration processes at the economic and          
political levels and the sociocultural sphere (cultural links, common norms, movement           
and communications), though sometimes lagging and complex, are interrelated and feed           
on each other, nonetheless; implying that the decision to omit or side step main issues               
related to the sphere of culture from the earlier treaties was merely a strategic choice               
rather than one of substance. In the words of Jean Monnet (1978), ‘To succeed, always               
choose the path of least resistance.’   Or as Haas (2004) noted,  16
Taking literally the text of the Treaty which calls on the High Authority to ‘orient               
and facilitate’ the initiative of the governments in creating a free labour market,             
the High Authority in 1953 worked out a series of proposals. They asserted the              
16 ​page 18, The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik (1998) 
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right of qualified workers to ​seek​ [Haas emphasis to contrast it with to ‘accept’ an               
offer] employment free from immigration and passport restrictions, other than          
those concerned with health and public order, recommended the issuing of an            
ECSC labour card to all qualified personnel which would entitle them to            
migrate…  (p. 498) 
 
As such, the macro-spillover from the economic-political spheres to the sociocultural            
field shows that deepening economic and political integration beyond a certain level            
between nations or regions is incompatible with the legal restriction of the free movement              
of persons living within the integrated area. In fact, labor mobility is one of the key                
conditions for successful, long term, integration according to Deutsch et al. (1957). It             17
also suggests integration, at least of the sort pursued by Europe, the union of peoples               
rather than just the union of States, would be attained not only by the formal but also by                  
the informal forms of interactions which involve social interactions, information, and           
cultural exchanges, and so on. The official form of integration alone isn’t necessarily a              
sufficient indicator of integration: as noted by De Witte (1990:208), “A comparative            
analysis of the three bilateral relationships established between Britain, France, and           
Germany clearly shows that the ​formal​ links between France and Germany are            
qualitatively superior to those established by either of those two with Britain; for             
informal links, however, the picture is exactly the opposite.” As Romero also tells us              
(1992:190), “Integration in Western Europe is extended primarily by informal factors.           
The formal level of integration - although not a prerequisite for most of these phenomena               
- can, however, activate a more complex interplay among various flows, which will             
ultimately alter their nature and extend their range.”  
17 P136, The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, third ed., 2003 
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This classic formal-informal spillover, according to which the unintended          
consequences of increasing political cooperation and cultural exchanges gradually grow          
from closer economic integration and interdependence, validated by the observed process           
on EI, strongly confirms the underlying link between the overall integration process and             
the pattern of increased cultural flows. And thus the developments of the EU system are               
not only consistent with the core idea of the neofunctionalist model; they moreover             
exhibit the general, systemic growth patterns by which systems increase in both size and              
complexity as noted in Section I (White, 1959; Johnson, 1982). In fact, as envisaged by               
the theory, an institutional spillover can also be seen to have occurred through not only               
the deepening of integration between the original six members but also the enlargement             
that now includes 28 members. Meaning, as Keohane and Hoffman (1990) put it, “A new               
form of spillover, not from one economic sector to another but from one institutional              
dimension to another, took place.” Thus, thanks to the developments that have taken             
place since 1951, the process now offers a rich and full characterization not only of when                
and how it has evolved - but also how it will quite predictably continue to grow in the                  
future. 
2.8 ‘The expansive logic of sector integration’ and growth of the integrative            
mechanisms 
The growth of the original feature of European integration, the ECSC, and how it has                
evolved into its present form, the European Union, offers a clear case study on the               
various mechanisms of the integration process in particular and the dynamic evolutionary            
processes of sociocultural systems in general. A complete process of Europeanization is            
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taking place, and various integrative mechanisms and strategies have evolved or been            
adopted to address the complexities and multidimensional aspects of the process showing            
that it is also changing in a systemic form and through differential allocation of functions               
among its parts: the states, regions, central institutions, businesses, etc., according to            
varied means or formulations the key of which is the principle of subsidiarity based on               
efficiency,  competency, and economy.  
2.9.1 ‘The principle of subsidiarity’ as separation of functions/powers within the EU  
The principle of subsidiarity, also related to the idea of the separation of powers or                
checks-and-balances principle in the US, is intended to ensure decisions are taken as             
closely as possible at the best possible level: at the citizen, local, national, regional or               
European level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the central institutions of the             
Union, except in the areas which fall within their exclusive competence, do not take              
action unless it is more effective than action taken at local, national or regional levels. It                
is directly bound up with the related principles of necessity and proportionality, which             
require that any action by the Union or Central Institutions should not go beyond what is                
necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties. 
2.9.2 The ‘multi-speed,’ the ‘enhanced cooperation’ form of differentiated         
integration 
The ‘multi-speed’ type of differentiated integration adopted by the EU allows            
common objectives to be pursued first by a group of member states both willing and able                
to proceed in a chosen area with the implication others will follow later when ready and                
able. It represented a different mechanism from the unanimity procedure which addressed            
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the questions of how far and how fast the process can go. Multi-speed based on the core                 
idea of common but differentiated capacity within the system. In other words, it             
recognizes that certain areas, states, or regions within the system do not progress or              
function at the same pace in all given areas as is formalized in the ‘enhanced cooperation’                
framework, thus, recognizing the fact that the European Union consists of uneven regions             
or subsystems which have achieved different levels of formal or informal integration.  
2.9.3 The ‘variable-geometry’ form of differentiated integration 
The ‘variable-geometry,’ which allows states ‘opt-outs’ from existing and new common            
European rules, represents another method of differentiated integration ​showing that          
there are sometimes irreconcilable functional or structural variances among the member           
states. The Schengen project and regime is an example of this variable geometry. Another              
related non-uniform form of integration is the Europe ‘a la carte’ procedure or construct              
which permits member states to select policies/areas of action as if from a set and then                
fully proceed in those items with the assumption there would be a minimum number of               
common objectives pursued. The Cohesion policy, implemented through a ‘structural’          
Fund, for regional development initiatives, illustrates the need to smooth over national or             
regional differences and reduce the effects of asymmetry in the system. 
These differentiated, uneven processes of integration show that, in practice, different            
mechanisms or formulations are required to bring together within a single institutional            
framework what was formerly separate, mostly disconnected and various national entities           
in Europe. In principle, the spillovers between sectors and/or spheres, however, show            
there is a given directional pattern of flow of exchange which illustrate causal             
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connections within the dynamic system. The observation here on the primacy of the             
economic sphere as the essential generator of integration activities in the process as well              
as the fact that the parts of the system do not all change at uniform speed or in a single                    
direction, follows the general thesis of economic determinacy theorized in section I.  
That is, the basic outline described here in terms of the primary trend and timeline of                 
the integration process is also consistent with the Sweet and Sandholtz (2003)            
observations and formulation on “Why does movement on any of the dimensions            
[spheres] occur in the first place?” and “Why do some policy domains move farther and               
faster toward the supranational pole than others?” (p.227). This is a detailed assessment             
of that by the two authors (2003):  
Our starting point is society, in particular, non-state actors who engage in            
transactions and communications across national borders, within Europe. These         
are the people who need European standards, rules, and dispute resolution           
mechanisms - who need supranational governance. In the beginning, the causal           
mechanism is quite simple: increasing levels of cross-border transactions and          
communications by societal actors will increase the perceived need for European           
level rules coordination, and regulation. In fact, the absence of European rules            
will come to be seen as an obstacle to the generation of wealth and the               
achievement of other collective gains. Separate national legal regimes constitute          
the crucial source of transaction costs for those who wish to engage in exchanges              
across borders: customs and other border controls, different technical standards,          
divergent health and environmental regulations, distinct systems of commercial         
law, divers national currencies, and so on. Further, the cost of transacting across             
borders are higher than those involved in contracting within a single           
member-state, to the extent that there exists no secure common legal framework            
at the supranational level, comparable in its efficacy to that of national legal             
systems. As transnational exchanges rise, so does the societal demand for           
supranational rules and organizational capacity to regulate. Transactors can exert          
pro-integration pressure on their own governments, but when these are reticent,           
transactors can access supranational arenas dominated by the Commission and the           
European Court of Justice. 
Government actors clearly have their own interests, which may include           
maximizing their autonomy and control over resources. They may resist the shift            
toward supranational policymaking. But as they do so, they inhibit the generation            
of wealth within their territory by those actors that depend on European            
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transactions. Such resistance is therefore sustainable only at a cost in prosperity.            
They can also attempt to slow integration or push it in directions favorable to their               
perceived interests, but they do not drive the process or fully control it. In a               
fundamental sense, governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to the         
integration that is going on all around them. (p. 228) 
  
That is, the EU, functionally, like all dynamic systems, has the natural tendency to               
regulate itself, and changes in one area or sphere are primarily therapeutic in nature to               
make the system not just efficient but also more symmetrical, balanced, and therefore             
towards stability or a state of dynamic equilibrium as economists prefer to call it.  
From the above analytic description of the behavior of European integration, the             
developments described within its evolutionary process, namely, that economic         
integration leads political coordination (unity), which in turn result in sociocultural           
integration, are highly consistent with the functionalist logic of change envisioned and set             
up by Jean Monnet (1888-1979) and others as reviewed in Section I and the              
neofunctionalist model presented and analyzed by Haas and others discussed in this            
section II according to which the structure of interrelated sectors or spheres of society              
changes when one or more of its subsystems change by means of spillover causal              
mechanisms. Thus, in ‘Europe needs more economic integration’ Josep Borrell Fontelles,           
former President of the European Parliament (2004-2007), identifies what he called a            
structural flaw in the EU according to which “while there is a common currency, the               
euro, there is no international governing body that determines fiscal strategies for the             
member -states, leading to inconsistencies in policy.” In other words, the logic of             18




which Sweet and Sandholtz referred to as ‘costs.’ As Balassa (1961) noted, “total             
economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and          
countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose           
decisions are binding for the member states.” So while fiscal union is needed by the logic                
of monetary union, the spillover thesis says that, if the integration process continues,             
sooner rather than later, there would be a fiscal union for the EU. This means for an                 
entire integration process to fully proceed on all interacting key subsystem areas, it must              
proceed along the lines suggested by anthropological theories based on the overall nature             
of sociocultural systems, processes and culture changes.  
It is therefore not surprising to see also a parallel form of ‘legal integration’ otherwise                
regarded as ‘institutional spillover’ - the process of evolving sets of legal arrangements             
within the system which bind sovereign States on rights and obligations that keeps the              
system strengthen itself as well as setting in motion the whole process of enlargement.              
The set of laws, and the growth of legal elements, otherwise the translations into              
operational terms of policies, constitute therefore a good indicator or measure of the state              
of the integration process. This proves, or rather shows, that overall European integration             
is a multi-speed, multi-sphere and multi-faceted process that includes other areas. As De             
Witte (1990) put it,  
The growing involvement of the European Community in culture and in education            
would seem to provide an excellent illustration, and partial vindication, of           
functionalist theories of integration. ‘Spillover’ into the cultural sphere takes          
place, roughly speaking, as follows. ​Market integration for economic activities          
implicitly but directly affects culture in its material form​ , but thereby also            
indirectly in its symbolic significance. National cultural policies are limited by           
those rules on market integration much more effectively than by any other explicit             
form of cultural cooperation. This limitation of national powers may, in turn, lead             
to the perception that some forms of regulation, to be effective, must be             
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transferred to the European level, in order to counterbalance the undesirable           
effects of market integration. All this constitutes a dynamic process which does            
not, at any given time, present a perfect equilibrium between the ‘negative’ and             
‘positive’ dimensions of integration, but instead is marked by major integration           




Following this overview of the ‘evolution and structure of European Integration’ which             
confirms that economic integration beyond a certain level does indeed lead to political             
integration or unity, we therefore expect to see strong, clear, and measurable effects that              
have been generated by the economic and political integration process on the linguistic             
situation since it's being argued in this and in the previous sections that changes occurring               
in any one or more subsystems or spheres of a system impact the other spheres through                
the now well-familiar spillover process. And since the main aim of this paper is to look at                 
the impact on the sociolinguistic situation, no further analysis is pursued concerning the             
chain of events, detailed examination of causal links, or exact nature and direction of              
causality between the economic and political spheres. Nor do we undertake a further             
separate analysis of the economic and political areas in part because economic integration             
and political coordination (unity), as we have shown, interact and reinforce each other on              
various levels and in interesting ways well beyond the intended scope of this paper.  
Since the more formal treaties aim to eradicate or minimize economic obstacles and              
political differences within the EU for the development of ​'an ever closer Union'​ whereas              
the official language position of the EU is for that member states to promote their               
national identity and language(s), according to the motto, '​United in Diversity'​ , we detect             
a notable contradiction within the system of some apparent mutually opposing or            
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cancelling forces or strategies: the logic of unity within the economic and political             
spheres which brings Europeans together on one hand, and the logic of diversity within              
the sociocultural and linguistic spheres acting as negative integration, on the other. Thus,             
we introduce four main potential paths of Europeanization through one of which the             19
overall process with its effects will continue to express itself in Europe:  
a) cultural diversity and linguistic diversity,  
b) cultural unity and linguistic diversity,  
c) cultural diversity and linguistic unity, and  
d) cultural unity and linguistic unity.  
The next section shows developments toward sociolinguistic integration including that           
of an evolving hierarchy of languages and the emergence of a common language. As              
White (1975:61) reminded us about languages and their nature, “Languages are not            
merely inert forms; they are dynamic systems. They grow and change... They compete             
with one another; some become archaic or extinct” - all of which is to say, man’s                
socio-economic, political, and cultural life are all interconnected, interdependent,         






19Potentially, it is  my own conception 
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PART TWO: Sections III 
Effect of economic integration and political centralization on linguistic diversity in 
Europe  
 
The study of language history shows that if two 
social groups come to be separated only by a 
mountain range or a wide river, they will soon begin 
to develop different habits of speech  (Crystal, 
2003) 
 
Genetically related languages form language     
families and they show systematic and recurrent       
formal correspondences, i.e. similarities and     
differences which are too regular and frequent to be         
mere chance or the result of borrowing. (Herbert        
Schendl, 2001)  
 
Some languages (Italian & Spanish, Czech and       
Polish) are so close that speakers of one can         
understand the other to some degree. How to use         
this asset for a diverse European society?       
(Intercomprehension: A linguistic phenomenon the     
EU Commission) 
 
Languages are not merely inert forms; they are        
dynamic systems. They grow and change. Grimm’s       
Law expresses certain tendencies in Indo-European      
languages. Languages differentiate, become    
diversified into sublanguages and dialects. They      
compete with one another; some become archaic or        
extinct. They are an essential part of everything that         
people do as ​human beings​ … Languages may       
inspire people to fight - even to the death - to decide            
which language shall be the official language of a         
province or city...  (White. 1975)  
 
3.1 Europe, language diversity, and why history of languages is important for            
language learning and policymaking in the EU 
In section I, I introduced the anthropological approaches and other theoretical           
foundations upon which to situate, observe, and analyze both the micro- and macro-levels             
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of sociocultural and politico-economic systems and their characteristics or tendencies.          
This contextualization was necessary because properly considered, European integration         
and the EU is one such evolving system. Section II has examined the dynamically              
interactive link between the economic and political spheres of this process or system and              
has reviewed its evolution and structure from the 1950s to the present as is generally               
discussed in the literature.  
In this section, we look at the diversity and unity of languages in Europe showing the                 
altering nature of sociolinguistic situations and how that affects the present state. It shows              
how preferential national policies helped created hierarchies of languages in every           
country and how national languages such as English, French, German, and Russian have             
emerged as more dominant regional languages mainly as a result of their countries sizes.              
Shown in this Section and the next one is also how the present integration is creating a                 
similar linguistic situation and hierarchy of languages with English emerging as the most             
favored one, at least for now - suggesting an interesting dynamic situation of competition              
and complementarity among languages has emerged. According to a recent European           
Commission Press Release (2012) , “Almost nine out of ten EU citizens believe that the              20
ability to speak foreign languages is very useful, and 98% say that mastering languages              
will be good for the future of their children, according to a new Eurobarometer opinion               
poll on EU citizens' attitudes towards multilingualism and foreign language learning.”  
While the focus of most European integration studies has been about understanding             
the relationship between the economic and political spheres as observed in the previous             
20 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-679_en.htm 
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section, less attention has been paid to the impact of the process on the more reactive                
sociolinguistic domain. Increased global interconnection, heightened interdependence       
and deepening European integration all occasioned by advanced technology         
developments in transport and communication systems, which allow greater movements          
and interactions of people, goods, services, and capital, mean that Europe’s languages are             
also increasingly coming into closer contact in a variety of ways to complement and to               
compete with one another in what is a highly pluralistic and open European society . The               21
European Commission reflecting the heterogeneous political and social facts within its           
institutions and member-states commits itself to the principle of "unity in diversity" and             
has set up research studies particularly devoted to the understanding of the overall             22
effects of the integration process on the diversity of national cultures, especially as             
related to linguistic differences and language use. It is part of a concerted effort in               
formulating strategies aimed at synchronizing concrete economic and political everyday          
realities with corresponding changes within the sociolinguistic sphere. This section          
discusses the evolution of Europe’s linguistic diversity and the emergence of present-day            
‘national languages’ as a result of barriers built around constructed political borders that             
came with the creation of nation-states; it shows the effect of economic integration and              
political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe.  
3.2 ​Evolution of linguistic diversity in Europe: its geographical, historical, and           
political factors  
21 Increased global interconnection, heightened interdependence all occasioned by advanced 
technology developments in transport and communication systems which allow greater movement 
and interaction of people, goods, services, and capital constitutes the paper’s ​antecedent condition 
- the phenomenon whose presence activated or magnified the operation of the causal variable (s) 
22 The Eurobarometer and the Eurostat 
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Linguistically, Europe is both ‘diverse’ and ‘homogenous’ mainly from the fact that             
most of its languages are intimately linked not just by such geography and political              
factors but also by a common ancestor: Indo-European, the hypothetical ancient language            
which ​shared common ancestry with the Indo-Iranian family of languages (Edwards,           
2013). And there are three main factors that have shaped Europe’s diverse linguistic             
kinships and histories, namely: the geographical, historical and political.         
Geographically, the major language boundaries and distributions are the Greco-Slavic          
languages of southeastern Europe, the Latin languages of southern Europe, the Celtic            
languages of southwestern Europe and the Germanic languages of northwestern Europe.  
Historically, population migrations within and between the regions have been one of             
the main factors that produced language situations: population dispersals have led to            
language divergence or the emergence of different languages while contacts between           
communities have brought about language convergence or similarities. That is, the           
contacts almost always allow exchanges between languages in the form of linguistic            
features such as lexical, syntactic, phonological, and morphological which leave historic           
marks on all the languages concerned. There is evidence that population movements have             
contributed to the distribution and redistribution of languages and linguistic features           
across Europe that gave rise to the present differences and similarities. what What was              
once single speech communities or languages have been transformed into various           
varieties or distinct languages by population migrations. They have brought speakers of            23
different languages into contact with one another in which some languages emerged as             
23 Such as when the Roman provinces split into distinct own languages: French, Spanish, 
Portuguese  
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mixed or dominant languages such English in the UK and Ireland and French in France               
and Belgium, and they have also caused other languages to thrive or to disappear              24
through processes well known to linguists (Crystal, 2000). The Roman Empire’s           
extension into what was its Provinces of France, Spain, Portugal, and the British Isles, for               
example, led to the spread of the Roman language, Latin, to what are today the other                
Latin languages of French, Spanish, and Portuguese with English as the exception            
because of a later spread of the Anglo-Saxon languages into England.  
Politically, the relatively recent evolution of the nation-states in Europe also has             
played a significant role that produced its own modern linguistic situations and dynamics             
in which politically favored languages were chosen and promoted, while others demoted.            
And in some cases, few languages even found a home in more than one state as a result                  
of the demarcations of state territoriality and sovereignty (Nelde, 1997) - a situation the              
present integration process is slowly reversing as it weakens or does away with national              
borders. Languages that were promoted and protected by States such as French, English,             
Spanish, for example, became today’s dominant national languages. Those that were           
demoted or undefended remained minority or marginal languages such as Breton in            
France or Cornish in England, for instance, while the ones that were split between or               
spread across different States emerged as overlapping regional languages. German, which           
is widely spoken in Central Europe and is co-official language in Germany, Switzerland,             
Austria, etc., is a good example of a regional language split between nation states. Thus,               
in some cases, people found themselves speaking a minority language in one area even              
24 The Breton and Celtic languages are thriving languages 
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though they belonged to a linguistic majority in another adjacent region or state. As              
Anderson (2012) tells us, “Centuries of French governments have striven to make that             
country linguistically uniform” with French as the favored language at the expense of             
many others: Basque, Breton, the Germanic language spoken in Alsace, Gascon, Picard,            
Provencal and several more that are “as different from ‘French’ in at least some cases as,                
for instance, Spanish is from Portuguese” (p. 13).  
Due to its diversity in unity, linguists therefore generally classify European languages             
into more or less four linguistic kinships that share clear cognate features and structural              
similarities across broad linguistic areas such as vocabulary, morphology, structure,          
syntax, grammar, etc. That is, the four groups are ‘West Romance, South Slavic, North              
Slavic, West Germanic, Scandinavian’ (Romaine, 1994). Though intra-group languages         
such as French and Spanish should, in principle, have more commonalities with one             
another than languages between groups such as Swedish and Italian, some languages            
exhibit features that are common to more than one group. This is explained by factors               
such as language ‘contacts’ and ‘spread’ over an area. For instance, English which             
developed in the British Isles due to such contact, is mainly a West Germanic language in                
its structure, grammar, and basic vocabulary though it has nearly twice as many words              
derived from Latin, French and Greek roots. Therefore it hardly fit neatly into these              
categories, whereas an isolate language like Basque does not have known close            25
genealogical kinship to any existing modern European language. This is how Schendl            
(2001) explains linguistic evidence due to contact of languages: 
In the history of practically every language, we come across syntactic           
25 The Basque are an indigenous people inhabiting the Basque Country in southwestern France and 
parts of northern Spain. 
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constructions that were once foreign to that language but which were (or are)             
common constructions in other languages with which the language in question           
was in contact. In studying such syntactic innovations linguists may, and often            
have, come to the conclusion that a change was brought about by ‘syntactic             
borrowing’. Cases in point in the history of English are the use of the absolute               
participle … in imitation of the Latin ablativus absolutus​ … ; the employment of              
subjectless relatives in Middle English (ascribed to French …); the development           
of peri-phrastic ​do​  (due to Celtic …), etc. (p. 102-103) 
 
As Crystal (2003) explains, that is why ​English speakers often have the luxury of               
choice from multiple parallel lexicons; one can say 'kingly' from the Anglo-Saxon            
language; 'royal' from French; or say 'regal' from Latin. ​That is to say, English is               
essentially a mixture of Germanic, French, Latin - and Celtic - making it the lucky               
recipient of all kinds of loanwords and linguistic features (p.23). In other words,             
according to Schendl (​2001), ​the ability to say or express an idea in English with different                
words similar in meaning as well as “​the use of the absolute participle … in imitation of                 
the Latin ablativus absolutus​ …; the employment of subjectless relatives in Middle            
English (ascribed to French …); the development of peri-phrastic ​do (due to Celtic …),              
etc.” all is due ​to this history of language contact (p. ​102-103). 
The following table is an example showing why English speakers often have this               
luxury of choice from multiple parallel lexicons. 
Table 1: English words identical in meaning of Germanic/Dutch and           
Latin/French origin 
English                     German/Dutch        Latin/French  
god/deity                     god                       deity 
holy/sacred                  holy                      sacred 
harbor/port                harbor                     port 
hate/detest                 hate                        detest 
first/primary              first                        primary 
foretell/predict           foretell                   predict 
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help/assist                  help                       assist  
lawful/legal                lawful                   legal 
answer/respond          answer                  respond 
meet/encounter           meet                     encounter 
height/altitude            height                   altitude 
hardship/difficulty      hardship               difficulty (dis-facultas) 
Other (O.E)/different  other                     different  
seem/appear                seem                     appear  
old/ancient                   old                       ancient 
teach/educate               teach                    educate 
tell/narrate                   tell                        narrate 
work/labor                   work                    labor 
wild/savage                 wild                      savage 
wage/salary                 wage                     salary 
whole/entire                whole                    entire 
tongue/language          tongue                  language 
 
Source: ​Various  
Nearly the ‘whole/entire’ English ‘tongue/language’ vocabulary can be traced to these             
donor languages. To further appreciate how English has evolved, the table below            
demonstrates how its words have been modified, for instance, from the Germanic forms. 
Table 2: English words of Germanic origin 
English                    German (or Dutch)  
god                            gott  
holy                           heilig  
good                          gut 
green                         grun  
world                         welt 
water                         wasser 
over                           uber 
help                            helfen  
answer                       andswaru  
see                              sehen 
self                             selbe/zelf 
other*(O.E)                ander 
speak                          sprechen /spreken  
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motherspeak              muttersprache  26
friend                          freund  27
love                             lufu/liebe 
which                          Welche 
for                               fur 
singing                        singen 
lip                                lippe 
Source:​ Various  28
The same can be demonstrated of Latin or French origins of the English vocabulary;               
in fact, most European languages are related this way. And for English, this special              
heritage constitutes some of its strongest appeals as well as one of the best arguments one                
can make for its promotion as a shared language for Europe. That is, a language that                
derived its heritage from not just the Germanic languages but Latin as well as other               
‘non-European’ languages globally (Crystall, 2003).  
English, however, also became a major loaner/donor of vocabulary to other languages             
such as modern Japanese. The following list shows how English words have been             
borrowed, adopted, and then adapted through a process of ‘nativization’ to become part             
of the Japanese language in Japan. It is a fascinating instance of role reversal in history                
where English itself is now the donor language on such a global scale as to precipitate the                 
evolution of distinct varieties such as Nigerian English, Indian English, etc in what is              
simply being termed ‘World Englishes’ (Kachru, 1992) or ‘Euro-English’ (the kind of            29 30
26 mother tongue - a person’s first language at home 
27 mein freund = my friend, literally 
28 More German verbs and their English equivalents can be found in Strutz (1964). 
29 varieties of English that have been developed under influenced by the United Kingdom or the 
United States  
30 I define ‘Euro-English’ as the emergence of a new continent-wide English variety with the 




compromised English Europeans of diverse backgrounds and nationalities speak when          
they interact). It demonstrates the reach and creativity of English and its global status -               
another strong argument for it as most suitable lingua franca in Europe. The following              
table presents an example of modern Japanese words of English origin.  
Table 3: English words that become Japanese words 
English                         Japanese  
old                                 orudo  
light                               raito 
desk                               denki 
boobs                             bubusu 
flares                              furea 
milk                                miruku 
girl                                  garu 
standing                          sutando 
left                                  refuto 
taxi                                 takushi  
English                           ingurisshu  
lose                                 ruzu 
salaried man                   sarariman 
conveyer belt                  beruto konbea  
school                             sukuru 
solar                                sora  
television                        terebi 
MacDonald’s                  makudonarudo 
 
Source​: Stanlaw (1992:178-208) 
 
This English-Japanese illustrates how English today is being appropriated not just in             
Europe where it shares history with others, but globally as well.  
These examples are interesting and significant on several levels: 1/ similarity of             
vocabularies with identical meanings between languages supported by history show          
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evidence of kinship. 2/ when languages borrow words from one another, the borrowing             
languages make sure that the loanwords conform, among other things, to their own             
phonological rules (Stanlaw, 1992), and 3/ distance is no barrier for contact and mixture              
between languages. This is true in all languages regardless of the period, environment or              
nature of their relationships. The English word ‘love’ was a transformation of the original              
German form ‘lufu,’ which is also being transformed into Japanese as ‘rabu.’ One can              
only imagine what form it would have if the Germans were to borrow the ‘new’ Japanese                
word ‘rabu’ and transform it into German since the word is of German origin…  
In fact, we know what happens when a word is borrowed, modified and is lent back to                  
the original loaner: Vendryes (1925) explains: 
Sometimes a word which has gone abroad and been lost to us may come back               
hundreds of years after. For example, ​flirt​ and ​budget are today borrowings from             
English; but we know that they were originally French words which crossed the             
channel at an early date. And yet it would be inaccurate to take seriously a               
metaphor which compares words to travelers passing and repassing frontiers. It is            
no longer an old French word ​fleurette that comes back to France, but an English               
word ​flirt that is introduced into our modern language. Nor is it the old French               
word ​bogete (little bag) that French people have taken back under the for form              
‘budget’​;​ it is a different word, a foreign word, signifying something quite other.             
(p. 194) 
 
This brief demonstration of the relatedness of languages is at the heart of evolutionary               
or historical linguistics.  
3.3 Linguistic diversity and mutual intelligibility in Europe 
Nichols (1992​) has made a useful distinction between "genetic diversity" and            
“structural diversity" of languages that enables us to determine degrees of their            
differences and similarities. The latter refers to the amount of disparity exhibited by a              
population of languages as a result of adaptation through contact with other languages.             
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The relative frequencies of structural features such as the order of Subject, Verb, and              
Object (SVO) or "word order and head/dependent type" shown as low or high in a               
language or group of languages – is the measure of the degree of structural diversity               
between languages. The former, "genetic diversity," is the number of discrete lineages            
such Germanic, Greek, Latin, and Slavic and the extent to which individual lineages have              
also branched out further such as Germanic into West Germanic, North Germanic, etc. It              
deals with relationships between languages which reflect their evolutionary histories and           
kinships. By using ‘genetic density,’ the ratio of genetic lineages to square miles within a               
geographic area, Nichols (1992:232-237) finds a low level of genetic diversity in Europe.             
That is, a majority of Europe’s languages belong to the above-noted four groups and              
hence low in genetic diversity while a proportionately fewer of them exhibit marked             
structural differences indicative of historic and frequent contacts and spreads. Low           
genetic diversity with a low level of structural diversity shows a high similarity between              
languages, language convergence, and unity of culture; it has implications on such issues             
as mutual intelligibility, difficulty or ease of mutual language learning. Romaine (2000)            
has provided an example of just how deeply similar Scandinavian languages or speech             
forms are to each other in spite of established political boundaries and superficial             
appearances:  
A Danish school principal told the story of how she gave a lecture to an audience                
in Stockholm from a manuscript which had been translated into Swedish. She            
said, ‘They understood me very well. Then I fumbled for an expression, and the              
audience cried out, “just talk Danish, you are so easy to understand”. I switched to               
Danish, to the great surprise of the Swedes, who understood nothing! They had             
thought I was talking Danish all along. (p. 13) 
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That is, like Urdu in Pakistan and Hindi in India, Swedish and Danish are counted as                
distinct languages though they are similar than, say, Cantonese and Mandarin are to each              
other - two languages commonly viewed as dialects of the same language, ‘Chinese.’ As              
Anderson (2012) notes,  
The putative unity of Chinese’ (as a construct encompassing the Sinitic           
languages) thus rests on facts such as the largely shared writing system, the             
existence of a standardized form of Mandarin (Putonghua) which is widely used            
as a sort of koine, and especially the political unity of the modern Chinese state:               
the individual Sinitic languages do not have separate flags, armies, and navies. (p.             
63) 
 
This illustration is both interesting and revealing. It is interesting because it             
demonstrates how profoundly similar some European ‘languages’ are to each other, and            
revealing because it shows how constructed political boundaries have helped promote           
behavioral attitudes on perceived language differences between people who live in           
different nation-states even when their languages are pretty similar or mutually           
intelligible to one another. As James and Lesley Milroy (1997:63) put it, other than those               
involving geographical factors, “Separateness of languages is therefore largely the result           
of social and political processes, and among these processes, language standardization is            
particularly important.” Standardization being, among other things, the preference and          
elevation of one language or variety above others and the insistence that people conform              
to that standard form of communication for intelligibility, comprehensibility, and          
interpretability.  
Thus, while geographical isolation and the construction of political borders are key             
factors that helped create the environment for the evolution of linguistic diversity and the              
preservation of linguistic differences in Europe, language contacts have also brought           
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about the evolution of linguistic hierarchies such as is the case with English, Hindi and               
the other languages in modern India (Kachru, 1985, 1990, 1992) and now English and the               
other EU languages. 
3.4 European integration and the evolving linguistic unity in Europe: its economic,            
political, and social factors 
Despite some major challenges such as the eurozone crisis and Brexit facing European              
integration that is explained elsewhere as well as the fact that the evolving language              
situation is still fluid, some results and a clear trend have already begun to attract               
attention, posing a number of questions and interpretations for policy positions on issues             
of language diversity, multilingualism, and need for a common language. As the evidence             
in this section and section iv indicate, the linguistic situation is increasingly adapting to              
what has always been an uncertain economic and political landscape as languages            
perform different roles and functions within the EU institutions and in European society.             
As the sections will show, a few languages have already emerged as the leading              
"integrative media" in different geographical areas and social contexts within the           
European Union where they now coexist with other national languages. In the remainder             
of the section, we examine these emerging linguistic changes as languages both            
complement and compete within what is becoming a single ranked linguistic space in             
Europe. 
We observed in section II a robust and systematic correlation between the growth of               
economic integration and the further development of political unity and cultural flows;            
the deeper the economic integration, the greater the political coordination or unity. Prima             
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facie, this suggests that the link is causal in nature showing that as the process of                
economic integration proceeds, more intermediary political structures and institutions         
correspondingly have emerged to regulate and harmonize the growing economic links.           
We now look at the sociolinguistic data to determine the trend or to what extent the                
dynamics of integration impact linguistic diversity. The method involves three steps:  
● estimating the languages most known to EU citizens other than mother tongues            
(I),  
● ranking the languages on a scale deemed useful to learn (II), and 
● comparing changes in the demand for second and foreign languages over a period             
(III).  
And these changes thus are the measures of ‘the effect of economic integration and              
political centralization on linguistic diversity in Europe’ in a transformational context.  
(I) Estimating the languages most known to EU citizens other than mother tongues 
Since nearly all Member States have single or major national languages within their              
borders, there is a good correlation between the population size of a State, the size of its                 
national language or mother tongue, and therefore languages known other than the            
mother tongue. Below is a recent data on the population sizes of each EU State .  31
Table 4: The nations of Europe, big and small (506 million total Europeans)  
* Countries with More than 10 Million  Native Speakers:  32
1. Germany, 81,  
2. Turkey, 76 *  33
3. France, 66 
31 Source: ​http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat​,  Newsrelease 108/2014. 
32 Figures are rounded to the nearest million 
33 Turkey is included, considered a European state and in the process of joining the EU 
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4. The United Kingdom, 64  34
5. Italy, 60  
6. Spain, 47 
7. Poland, 39 
8. Romania, 20 
9. Netherlands, 17 
10. Belgium, 11  
11. Greece, 11 
12. The Czech Republic, 11 
13. Portugal, 10 
* Countries with More than one Million but less than 10 Million Native Speakers  
14. Hungary, 9, 9 
15. Sweden, 9, 6  
16. Austria, 8  
17. Switzerland, 8  
18. Bulgaria, 7  
19. Serbia, 7  
20. Denmark, 6  
21. Finland, 5  
22. Slovakia, 5  
23. Norway, 5  
24. Ireland, 5  
25. Croatia, 4  
26. Lithuania, 3  
27. Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia, 2  
28. Slovenia, 2 
29. Latvia, 2  
30. Estonia, 1  
* Countries with less  than million native speakers:  35
31. Cyprus 900  
32. Montenegro 600 
33. Luxembourg 500  
34. Malta 400  
35. Iceland 300  
36. Liechtenstein 37 
Per a Special Eurobarometer 243 / Wave 64.3 (2006) report on the language skills of                
European citizens and their attitudes towards other European languages, German not           
surprisingly is the most widely spoken mother tongue in Europe (18%) followed by             
34 See discussion on Postscript 
35 Figures rounded to the nearest thousandth 
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English and Italian with shares of 13% each. 12% of Europeans speak French as a mother                
tongue, and so on. Since this basic statistical measure represents or is an accurate              
indication of the overall population size of the countries concerned, we expect this             
country-to-sociolinguistic data correlation to remain a constant feature in Europe for the            
foreseeable future relatively. That is, the same proportions shall be more or less speaking              
these languages as native tongues. Statistically, therefore, this national         
population-to-language correlation favors the large countries such as Germany with 18%           
of Europeans claiming it as native tongue because of its population size (81 million              
speakers). That is, more than half of the EU citizens (18+13+13+12 = 56%) speak one of                
these four languages as mother tongues while only 44% speak the other remaining             
languages as their mother tongues. 
This is consistent with the conclusion that, other than the institutional support             
languages receive that extends their reach, a country’s population size or national            
demography remains one of the primary sources of language vitality (McConnell, 1997:            
354) which is another way of saying that in Europe, “Apart from English, the rank order                
of languages more or less follows the rank order of inhabitants.”  36
One of the features of this correlation is that since the populous countries are also                
some of the most prosperous and advanced economies in the Union, people in these              
countries can be less inclined or compelled to learn the languages of those in the less                
developed, less prosperous, and less populated countries who are more likely to have             
greater incentives for learning the languages of the populous/prosperous countries. This           
36 Eurobarometer Report Number 55, 2001:82 
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is, since the freedom to work, travel, and study in another Member State - causal factors                
for the new linguistic situation - is one of the compelling arguments for integration by               
many EU citizens who are from less developed and prosperous economies. This also             
suggests that, in the future, as many more Europeans move into the more affluent              
countries and learn how to speak their languages, more people will therefore speak the              
dominant languages of these countries - at least as second or foreign languages, perhaps              
with the exception of Spanish, which is showing an increased demand from people living              
in the four leading countries for reasons associated with its significance and standing in              
Latin America , for example. Moreover, since those in the more developed and            37
prosperous countries have little need to learn and acquire new language skills of the              
languages of the lesser economies, then they will also be more likely to know fewer               
languages such as the Germans and the French or may even remain monolingual speakers              
especially for native English speakers whose language is being learned more and more by              
other Europeans. This, however, has already been seen both an asset as well as a liability                
for the mostly monolingual British with their mostly English-only language skills.           
According to a British Council study conclusion, ​“​It is a widely held – if not undisputed                
– view that the UK is lacking in the necessary language skills for the future, partly                
because of the status of English as the language of international communications.” This             38
observation is consistent with the remarks made earlier that the big and more prosperous              
37 This is a case of an exogenous cause having an effect within the EU: how Spanish does in the 
US and Latin America affects its relative position among other EU languages in EU. In the next 
chapter, we will see how English does globally equally affects its relative positions against the other 




countries tend to have less incentive for acquiring knowledge of languages from the small              
and less prosperous ones.  
Thus, in 2001 , in addition to their mother tongue, the languages most well-known by               39
Europeans are predictably as follows: English (41%), French (19%), German 10%),           
Spanish (7%), and Italian (3%).  
The remaining languages had scores of less than three percent each. This means that               
80% of EU citizens (41+19+10+7+3=80%) now know at least one of these five             
languages. More significantly, it means one needs only English (41%) and French (19%)             
to be understood by at least 60% of all Europeans. And other than these five languages,                
the rest of the other EU languages are spoken, for all practical purposes, only by those                
who claim them as their mother tongues, which is another way of stating that they are not                 
that much spoken by others either as second or foreign languages outside of their home               
countries.  
In fact, according to a Eurobarometer 2001 survey (Report Number 55) on knowledge              
of languages in the EU: “Forty-seven percent of EU citizens speak a language other than               
their mother tongue well enough to take part in a conversation. However, there are large               
variations between the Member States, with people in Luxembourg most likely to speak a              
‘foreign’ language (97%) and people in the UK (27%) least likely to do so.” Again, this                
outcome is highly consistent with what has already been noted here that people in smaller               
states are more likely to learn other European languages while those of big states with               
influential languages are less likely to do the same. In fact, the contrast can’t be more                
39 ​Eurobarometer 2001 survey (Report Number 55) ? 
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revealing since not only is the UK home of native English speakers, but Luxembourg is               
also one of the smallest states and the home to not just its own national language,                
Luxembourgish, but the two other important European languages: French and German.           
Needless to say, the ability or inability to speak more than one language is neither good                
nor bad in itself; however, it can be either a liability or an asset, for those able to speak                   
more languages can be more likely to take advantage of more opportunities in             
multilingual societies such as Europe.  
Thus, in estimating the languages most known to Europeans other than mother tongue,              
the five languages - English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian are the most known              
respectively. This argues that while the absolute strength of these languages isn’t            
dependent on the integration process, their evolving relative worth within the European            
Union is. Below we investigate what this relative rank within the EU reflects. 
(​II) Ranking the languages on a scale of deemed useful to know 
​Following the European Commission’s survey and analysis service, we can assess             
and interpret any sociolinguistic changes based on languages Europeans deem most           
useful to know.  
In 2006 when asked which two languages, apart from your mother tongue, do you               
think children should learn as citizens of the EU?  The results were predictable: 
77% of the EU citizens consider that children should learn English as their first              
foreign language while the rest of the respondents were divided among the            
remaining other major languages: French, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian and          
Swedish in that order. English is number one in all countries polled, except the              
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Luxembourg. French follows next with a 33%           
share and German receives support from 28% of the respondents.  40
40 ​http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_sum_en.pdf​ (“EUROPEANS AND 




That is, English (77%), French (33%), German (28%), Spanish (19%), Russian (3%),            
Italian (2%), and Swedish (0%). Below is the full table showing the relative rank of the                
seven major languages people deem the most useful to speak, apart from their mother              
tongue in each country.  
Table 5: Language preferences for children within the EU 
 Apart from your mother tongue, which two languages do you  
think children should learn? 
English French German Spanish Russian Italian       
Swedish (%)  
EU25     77%        33%         28%        19%         3%         2%         0%  
BE         88%        50%         7%           9%          0%         1%         -  
CZ         89%        9%           66%         4%          9%         0%         -  
DK         94%        13%         62%         13%        0%         0%         0%  
DE         89%        45%         3%           16%        6%         2%         -  
EE         94%        6%           22%         1%          47%        0%        1%  
EL          96%        34%         50%         3%          0%         6%         -  
ES         85%         44%        14%         4%          0%          1%         -  
FR         91%         2%           24%        45%         0%         6%         -  
IE           3%           64%         42%        35%        1%          4%         0%  
IT           84%         34%         17%        17%         0%         0%         -  
CY         98%         49%         19%         2%          4%          4%        0%  
LV          94%         6%            28%        1%          42%        0%        0%  
LT          93%          6%           34%        2%          43%         0%        0%  
LU          59%          83%         43%        2%          0%          1%         -  
HU         85%          4%           73%        3%           2%          2%        -  
MT         90%          24%         13%        2%            -             61%      -  
NL          90%          22%         40%        21%         0%          0%        -  
AT          84%          29%         2%          10%         4%          11%      -  
PL          90%          7%            69%        1%          10%         1%       -  
PT          90%          60%          8%          7%           -              0%       -  
SI           96%           6%            69%        3%          0%           2%      0%  
SK         87%           7%             75%        3%          6%          1%       0%  
FI           85%           10%           24%        3%          10%         0%      38%  
SE         99%            17%          35%         31%       1%           0%      1%  
UK         5%              71%          34%         39%       1%           3%       -  
BG         87%            13%          49%         5%         14%         1%       -  
HR         82%            5%            69%         2%         0%           14%     -  
RO         64%            34%          17%         7%         2%           8%       -  
TR         72%            12%           52%         1%         2%           1%       -  
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Source:   41
This data confirms that, for most Europeans of all countries and regions, English is               
the clear choice for the language deem most useful to know, followed by either French or                
German depending on the particular countries or region. It means that a new linguistic              
situation, at present a tri-lingual one, has or is evolving in Europe in which most               
Europeans who speak languages other than English, French, and German as their mother             
tongues are now acquiring them as their regional language or English as the all-regions              
lingua franca. ​This is the immediate future of Europe and its likely distant future as               
well unless some major unseen linguistic situations emerge that disrupt the present            42
trend. ​It is the new linguistic situation for Europe replacing the old one that rose when                
the nation states were created. 
(III) Comparing changes in the demand for second and foreign languages over a             
period 
Using data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer and Eurostat, this           
subsection highlights the extent to which a clear trend has or is emerging, statistically.              
Below we reproduced the EU’s official language membership list in chronological order,            
first.  




Danish, English 1973 
Greek 1981 
Portuguese, Spanish 1986 
41  ​http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_sum_en.pdf  
42 It would be interesting to see the future of English in the EU institutions if and when the UK leaves 
the EU and it looses it official status; see postscript for more on that. 
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Croatian  2013 
 
Source  43
That is, the original official EU languages in 1958 were Dutch, French, German, and                
Italian; English and the rest of the other languages did not join the official list until 1973.  
The surveys by the EU Commission have shown the extent to which European feelings                
and attitudes toward the EU institutions and their languages have changed over time as              
the integration process unfolds. Since European economic and political integration is the            
causal variable generating changes within the sociolinguistic sphere, the results have           
followed an expected pattern: as the integration process goes, so has that been reflected in               
the linguistic situation. For example: 
In 1987 , within what was the EC12, the national languages spoken at home were:               44
Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish. Then one           
out of three citizens of the European Community spoke at least one foreign language              
‘well enough to follow a conversation’. Of those interviewed, 51% had at least some              
training in English, 42% in French, 33% in German; while to speak ‘well enough to               
follow a conversation,’ 36% spoke English, 27% French, and 25% German.  
43 ​ ​http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/officiallanguages/index_en.htm 
44 ​http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb28/eb28_en.pdf  
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Fast forward, in 2001 , in addition to their mother tongue, the language most known               45
by Europeans is English (41%), followed by French (19%), German 10%), Spanish (7%),             
and Italian (3%). In 2001, the languages widely considered as the most useful to know               
apart from the mother tongue were: English 69%, French 37%, German 23%, and             
Spanish at 19%. Only 5% of the EU population believed other languages would be most               
useful to know. 
In 2006 , ‘83% of EU25 respondents said knowing other languages is advantageous             46
while 50% of Europeans agree with the view that everyone in the EU should be able to                 
speak two languages in addition to their mother tongue.’ 
In 2012 , when asked to name the two languages, apart from their mother tongue, that                47
they believed to be most instrumental for their personal development and for children to              
learn for their future, most Europeans think English is the most useful language at 67%,               
German at 17%, French 16%, Spanish 14%, and Italian at 5%. Chinese at 6% and               
Russia’s 4% were also mentioned as among other non-EU languages good to know for              
personal development. No other language is specified as being of significant use by             48
more than 1% of respondents.  
​According to a 2015 Press Release by Eurostat (164/2015) , “In 2013, 17.7 million              49
primary school pupils (or 81.7% of all the pupils at this level) in the European Union                
45 ​ ​http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb55/eb55_en.pdf​) 
46 ​ ​http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_sum_en.pdf 
47 ​http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf 
48 Mandarin Chinese is perceived to gain status with the rise of China while Russian was the lingua 





(EU) were studying at least one foreign language, including 1 million (4.6%) studying             
two foreign languages or more. At primary level, English was by far the most popular               
language, studied by 16.7 million pupils.” As per the same Eurostat, “The second most              
commonly studied foreign language at both primary and lower secondary level and upper             
secondary level was French (19 per cent of pupils in primary and lower secondary level               
and 23 per cent in upper secondary), followed by German (nine per cent, and 21 per cent,                 
respectively) and Spanish (six per cent and 18 per cent, respectively).” The evidence has              
shown that, over time, more and more Europeans are learning another language, and that              
English has emerged as their clear first foreign or second language of choice. And these               
reordering of the languages by merit of usefulness by and large shows a clear              
development toward a well-defined language hierarchy consistent with the theoretical          
postulations discussed in section I and the predicted outcome outlined in section II.  
3.5 Brief comment and conclusion 
In this section, I examined the linguistic situation in Europe from past to present in a                 
transformational context showing how the Nation States system and national language           
policies helped create a hierarchy of languages in every country and how national             
languages such as English, French, German, and Russian emerged as more dominant            
regional languages in Europe mainly as a result of their countries sizes. This is because               
empirical researchers using the same or similar data typically measure such changes            
without assessing their link to the causal variables that generate the changes over time. In               
analyzing the economic and political integration as the dynamically causal variable           
(process) in Section II and the ongoing changes in the linguistic situation as the effect or                
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reactive variable in this Section III, we have therefore shown the cause-to-effect link             
between the two phenomena. That is, within this framework, changes in the linguistic             
sphere are explained by the integration process that determines the basic course of the              
EU. 
The next section looks further at the changes in the linguistic situation by examining                


















PART TWO: Sections IV 
Effect of economic integration and political centralization on the functions and  
 
status of the English language in Europe  
 
In 1958, the then European Economic Community       
passed a Regulation naming Dutch, French, German       
and Italian as its official languages, these being the         
languages of the first six countries to join the         
organization.  (EU Commission) 
 
When dominant languages feel they are being       
dominated, something much bigger than a simplistic       
conception of power relations must be involved.       
Crystal (1997) 
 
In several Asian and African countries, English now        
has national and international functions that are       
both distinct and complementary. Kachru (1990) 
  
In Section II, I examined the evolution and structure of European integration showing the              
interactions of its principal spheres and how the functional spillover mechanism, in            
particular, maintained the process and brought about integration from one sector, sphere,            
or economy to another. I also examined how the formal and informal processes of the               
process function and how different roles and functions are allocated between the EU,             
Member States, and other agents through the subsidiary mechanism. Section III examined            
the cumulative impact of the processes on linguistic diversity more generally which has             
posed some interesting questions and policy challenges for policymakers on the European            
integration. The section also explained how the current EI process, which seeks the             
removal of political borders which act as linguistic barriers, for instance, has generated a              
reverse sociolinguistic situation as a consequence where languages are coming into           
contact in what is increasingly becoming a shared sociolinguistic space for language            
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complementarity and competition. Thus, as demonstrated in the previous sections a           
significant measure of sociolinguistic disturbance and linguistic transformation, triggered         
mainly by the processes of integration, is taking place in Europe. That is, the evolution of                
a new linguistic situation with the formation of a pecking order of language hierarchy led               
by the emergence of a new Continent-wide English variety with the distinctive            
characteristics of the overall sociolinguistic situation and broader European         
macro-cultural context . As recent surveys indicate, “The five most widely spoken           50
foreign languages remain English (38%), French (12%), German (11%), Spanish (7%)           
and Russian (5%).”   51
Evidently, there are various sub-sociolinguistic situations evolving in Europe that are            
also of interest in their own right: situations within individual speakers, country, region,             
and within the institutions of the European Union. However, here I mainly look at the               
reason or reasons that are propelling English as the top EU working and integrative              
language. And as English keeps on increasing its share of being the most use language               
within the EU institutions as well as the most commonly spoken second and foreign              
language by most Europeans at the expense of the others, most notably French and              
German, several studies have sought to explain the forces or factors behind its rise and               
current position as now the de facto European lingua franca. Many observers of English              
including Kachru (1992) have noted that this is not the first time the language is involved                
in “historically and linguistically interesting and complex” situations where it competes           
50 A European English variety comparable to the British, American, or Australian English varieties              
because of its distinctiveness from them 




and complements other languages (p. 53). In fact, for Crystal (1997), “There is the closest               
of links between language dominance and economic, technological, and cultural power,           
too, and this relationship will become increasingly clear as the history of English is told”               
(p. 7). This section looks at the brief history, the role played by economic, political and                
other factors in the development, spread, and dominance of the English language globally             
as well as its present function and status within the European Union.  
4.1.  A brief historical overview of the development of the English language 
Linguists generally (and conveniently) classify English as belonging to the Germanic            
branch of the Indo-European language family - a family now considered the largest and              
most widely spread and diffused group estimated to have about three billion or 46%              
speakers worldwide ​(​Ethnologue, 2014​)​. As I have noted in section III, in many ways              52
English is mainly a West Germanic language that is also historically and strongly             53
related to the Latin and Greek languages. 
The Roman Empire, at its height of power in the second century C.E, extended to                
Britain in the far fringes of Western Europe. The language of the Empire, Latin, became               
the language of government, power, and prestige throughout its provinces including           
Britain. As the Roman Empire began to disintegrate by the fifth century A.D and Latin               
split into its four well-known modern languages (Italian, French, Spanish, and           
52 Nations of Indo-European speakers: ‘Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,          
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia,           
Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq,            
Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Maldives, Myanmar,            
Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian          
Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden,           
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican State, Venezuela’  
 
53 See Section III for detail explanation of the German origin of basic English words.  
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Portuguese), large groups of Germanic and Scandinavian speaking peoples began to           
descend on Britain, bringing with them the Anglo-Saxon languages and culture (the order             
of events can also be reversed according to which it was the coming of the Anglo-Saxon                
peoples into the Roman Provinces which caused or accelerated Roman disintegration ).           54
In any case, as they become the dominant economic and political power in Britain their               
languages, West Saxon in particular, also mixed with and came to dominate the ‘native’              
Celtic (or the autochthonous) languages and Latin which gave the ancient English its first              
mix of lexicon and grammatical structures which at times frustrate researchers interested            
in its etymological and often irregular features . 55
Furthermore, the Norman Conquest of what is now "England" in 1066 C.E. moreover              
further changed the evolution and structure of the language; for about three centuries             
‘Old French’, a language similar to Latin, became the new language of the law,              
administration, and the courts in Britain. During this period, Old English mixed with this              
language too and evolved into Middle English which left French, and through it even              
more Latin words, with significant influence especially on the lexical inventory of the             
language as demonstrated in the previous section. The evolution and development into            
54 “Meanwhile Roman power on the Continent came under irresistible pressure from barbarian             
invaders. The Goths crossed the Danube and in 378 annihilated a Roman army and killed the                
Emperor Valens. In 406 an enormous horde of Germans swarmed across the Rhine and descended               
on France. They could not be driven out but were with difficulty ejected into Spain and North Africa.                  
The city of Rome itself was sacked by the Goths in 410. The Empire in the West fell to pieces. The                     
British were left to fend for themselves.” (Richard Cavendish, p6)  
55 For instance, “The England of the Megalithic period felt the impact of a strong Negroid                
Egyptian-Phoenician influence. In fact, the first Phoenician and Sidonian navigations of the Bronze             
Age are contemporaneous with the XVIIIth Egyptian Dynasty…; the Phoenicians, subjects and            
brokers of the Egyptians, fetched tin from the Sorlinguan Islands, meaning from England… It was in                
this period that a pre-Christian African vocabulary came into what was to become the English               
language: ancient Saxon.”  Diop (1991:19)  
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Modern English have since been shaped by a wide range of other comparable events or               
influences: European Renaissance and the resurgent interest in the Greco-Roman          
traditions, development of modern science and technology using Greco-Latin roots in           
English, British global colonial expansion, the founding of the United States, and so on.              
In each case, the English language underwent substantial change and enrichment with            
more lexicon from such linguistically diverse places as Africa, North America, and Asia             
as evidenced by a wide variety of modern loan words in the language. Its expanded               56
vocabulary as well as the high number of words it has for expressing related ideas, which                
all have contributed in making it a rich and attractive language of choice, is due to these                 
historic contact and language exchanges. Together, these profound developments account          
for the fact that at present over 75 percent of all English words and the vocabulary of the                  
modern sciences and technology have Latin or Greek roots, according to Crystal (2003). 
A great deal more could be said about the chronological development of the English               
language including a further detail history to account for the various layers of lexical and               
grammatical elements that entered it at different periods in its history - as we have               
demonstrated in section III. However, the fact that it is also possible to show a strong link                 
between the economic and political factors (​the interactive co-independent variables​ ) and           
the spread and development of the language (​the dependent variable​ ) has led some             
analysts to argue that there is a positive link between the two phenomena (for instance,               
56 The English word ‘coffee’, for instance, is from the Fulani word ‘kade’ for ‘bitter beans’ via the                  
Asian form ‘kave’ or ‘kafe’ - a linguistic fact which can be inferred from the fact that coffee is a                    
Sudanic/Ethiopian native bean; ‘banana’ is also a West African word probably from the Mande              
language; the words ‘guru’ for a teacher and ‘totem’ for kin group (a concept of great value for                  
anthropologists) are from the East Indian and Native American languages respectively; just as the              
word ‘ginseng’ for the name of a plant, is of Asian origin. 
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see Kachru (1990), Phillipson (1992), Crystal (2003), Graddol (1997, 2006)). 
4.2 The economic and political factors and the global spread of English  
Many comparisons have been made between the conditions and processes that gave             
rise to past lingua francas such as old Egyptian (Fulani), Chinese (Mandarin), Arabic,             
Latin, and French and the present situations of Spanish in Latin America, Swahili in East               
Africa, and that of English both globally and in Europe. In each case, analysts have               
argued that languages prestige, its functions, status, and spread are causally linked to the              
technological, economic and cultural power of its speakers, In their view it was             
inevitable, with England and later the United States leading world industrial capitalism            
and the information age in the last two centuries, that English would correspondingly             
become the dominant global language. Moreover, with the establishment of British- and            
US-led global institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and many             
others, it was also argued that the global standing and role of English would be               
maintained and further enhanced.  
But how exactly are the two phenomena - economic and political power and the rise                
of the language correlated? 
4.3 The ‘grassroots theory’ and the ‘exploitative theory.’ 
There are two basic approaches usually employed in the literature to explain the              
relationship between economic and political factors and language dominance: "the          
grassroots theory" and "the exploitative theory" (Mair 2002). The latter refers to a             
situation in which a dominant language in contact with lesser prestigious languages exerts             
strong constraining pressure on their range and function such that the contact tragically             
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results in what linguists are increasingly referring to as either ‘language murder’ or             
‘language suicide.’ In varying degrees, the dominant language spreads over, assimilates,           
or replaces the lesser prestigious ones in a manner that gradually leads to either ‘linguistic               
obsolescence’ or the ‘loss of domains.’ Dominant languages such as Spanish in Latin             
America that spread in this way at the expense of others are known as ‘killer languages.’                
The latter, the grassroots theory, refers to a rather limited and more voluntary use of a                
dominant language typically among speakers of mutually different languages as a           
common, available, and neutral language such as in Singapore where Malay, Tamil.            
Mandarin and English coexist with English functioning as the common language. Given            
this, the exploitative model arguably does not quite fit neatly describe the current spread              
of English within Europe. That is, the 'grassroots' theory which emphasizes a utilitarian             
function for the rise of the language, therefore, must be included. I explained this by the                
link between the enhanced global position of English outside of the EU by both the               
exploitative and the grassroots models and its current status within Europe by the             
grassroots model. That is, English does well in Europe as it rises globally.  
Kachru has made a useful contribution in this connection by incorporating            57
extra-linguistic, sociopolitical and demographic variables to explain the influence and          
role of English in native and non-native countries or settings. His model consists of three               
concentric circles: inner, outer, and expanding in which each circle consists of a set of               
countries where the language performs different functions and has different statuses: as a             
mother tongue, an official language, and a foreign or international language, respectively.            
57 Cited by Crystal In English as a Global Language (2003: 60-61).  
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That is, the inner circle represents countries where English functions as a mother tongue              
such as the UK or the US. In the outer circle, for historical reasons, it plays a significant                  
part in the country's’ administrative and educational institutions and functions as an            
official language such Nigeria and India. In the expanding circle, however, it is widely              
and mostly used as a lingua franca or ‘connecting’ foreign language – that is, in those                
countries where the language has played no administrative or historical role such as             
China and Russia. The relationship between the circles is described as 'norm-providing'            
(inner), norm-developing' (outer) and 'norm-dependent' (expanding). This relationship,        
however, is soon to be reversed, at least, according to Graddol (2000:5): “The main areas               
of development in the use and form of English will undoubtedly come from non-native              
speakers.” That is, the innovation will originate from the outer and expanding circles or              
countries to the inner one. 
4.4 The different functions and roles of English in different countries 
The figure illustrates the role of English in each circle according to Kachru: 
Figure 1. The different roles of English 
82 
In this subsection, I shall, therefore, apply this model to show the functions of the                
language within each circle and why it is increasingly becoming the primary integrative             
language as well as the first choice for most Europeans.  
Kachru (1992:58) identifies four key functions the English language performs in            
different local, national, and global contexts which according to him have made it highly              
competitive and the natural choice in a growing number of countries including Europe:  
1. instrumentality​  – English as a medium of learning in educational systems;  
2. regulative​  – English in administrative and legal systems; 
3. imaginative​  – English in various literary genres, and  
4. interpersonal – English as a link language between speakers of different           
languages or dialects in socio-linguistically pluralistic societies and as a language           
of elitism and modernization.  
That is, English performs various combinations of these functions in different countries            
for different persons depending on the local situation: as mother tongue, a national             
language, an official language, and a foreign or international language.  
Since many EU national languages are also highly developed languages and perform              
many of these functions in their respective countries, therefore it is mainly the             
‘interpersonal’ (and international) functions use among a growing majority of EU citizens            
as well as the rest of the world that account for the continuing rise in the demand for                  
English in Europe. In fact, Ammon (2015) has blamed the low standing in the global               
market of languages on poor German language policies.  
More recent studies have indicated that English is also gradually playing an important              
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role as a medium of learning in the educational systems in much of the European Union                58
in spite of these function having been traditionally performed by national languages. This             
increasing role for English is consistent with the emerging linguistic situation and EU             
language policies that encourage EU citizens and require EU students to learn and to              
become proficient in at least one or two EU languages other than their mother tongues               59
one of which is almost always English. Thus, the spread of English in Europe can be                
considered as the result of many factors that enable it to meet and advance the               
communicative needs of an integrating Europe than can similarly be accomplished by            
other languages given their functional reaches in Europe and globally.  
In some countries or even regions, German can perform many of these functions quite               
well, while in other nations, it is French that performs them well. The Russian language,               
for historical reasons already noted, is also used for some functions in some regions,              
especially in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe. None of these languages,             
however, increasingly performs all functions at all levels - at the intrapersonal, local,             
national, regional, European, and international as effectively as English does for           
Europeans. For instance, if a Danish wants to speak or do business with someone in               
Greece, a German doing business with a Gambian, a Polish talking to a Singaporean              
business representative, a Swedish vacationing in Italy, a random EU officials interacting            
at a Cafe at the European Parliament, in any of these interlocutions, the chances are that                
English would the language use in the majority of cases. 
And since languages that cannot or do not perform these functions satisfactorily would              
58 Various European Commission Studies and Surveys have shown that English is becoming more 
and more the medium of learning 
59 defined as the language first learned and still spoken by an individual  
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be relatively disadvantaged and thus less in demand, therefore, this is the key to              
understanding why English is becoming so successful within Europe. In fact, such a             
linguistic situation where speakers of different languages are motivated or compelled to            
adopt English as their common and convenient language is not a new phenomenon.  
The linguistic and cultural pluralism in Africa and South Asia contributed to the             
spread of English, and helped foster its retention even after the colonial period             
ended. The nationalist awakening needed a pan-national medium for a resurgence;           
the medium chosen was, ironically, the “alien” language. And there were reasons,            
both cultural and linguistic, for that choice (Kachru, 1990:7-8). 
 
Crystal (2003) has summed up the global context that gave rise to the position of the                
English language today this way: “The present-day world status of English is primarily             
the result of two factors: the expansion of British colonial power, which peaked towards              
the end of the nineteenth century, and the emergence of the United States as the leading                
economic power of the twentieth century” (p. 59). Graddol (1997) and Crystal (2003)             
have also identified the following major areas where English is already universally            
recognized as the global language as the direct result of the two factors Crystall (2003)               
discussed: 
● the language of world trade, and banking 
● the working language of international conferences and organizations 
● the language of international law 
● the language of international travel safety: aviation and maritime 
● the language of global brands advertisements  
● the language of international tourism  
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● the language of physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, technology transfer,         
academic (scientific) publications   60
● the language of the media/press, public broadcasting, the internet, and cultural           
audio-visual products such as popular music, film, and TV  
● the language of higher or university education, literature, and  
● increasingly, the ‘relay language’ in translation and interpretation within the EU           
institutions 
These are some of the universally recognized key functional areas that give the English              
language the decided advantage over its competitors. And it is also the interplay of these               
functions, together with ‘the prestige factor’ on English as the language of progress as              
well as the ‘neutral language factor,’ which makes the language the inevitable choice as              
lingua franca for Europe. Harold Schiffman (1997) explains how the perception of            
English as the preferred ‘neutral language’ between the speakers of different countries in             
Europe has already helped raised its status as their lingua franca. "The use of the               
H-variety German in Alemannic Switzerland conversely may be seen as a power-trip            
designed to put the Swiss speaker at a disadvantage. The fact that the Hochdeutsch              
speaker may have no alternative L to use may be irrelevant; it certainly explains the               
desire to switch to ‘neutral’ English or French” (p. 214). That is, by opting for English, it                 
places everyone on an equal footing, except for native English speakers whose advantage             
can be reduced only by the evolution of a real European English variety. 
4.5 The principle of natural selection as it applies to ​language competition and             
60 ‘Publish in English or perish’ means to be able to reach as many peer readers, within the 
academic field, one has to publish in English... 
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complementarity and the rise of English dominance  
Given that French, along with English, is the co-official and working language of most               
international bodies, the fact that it is the only other truly global language besides              
English, given that German is also the language of the most populous and economically              
dynamic European nation, and given that at present both French and German are             
threatened by the growing demand and use for English throughout Europe itself - suggest              
that the principle of Natural Selection, popularly known as ‘survival of the fittest’, may              
also apply in situations of linguistic diversity within a common space. That is, under              
natural selection, adaptive or “advantageous” feature tend to produce more successful           
ones than their peers do, perhaps accounting for the luck of languages in situations of               
linguistic diversity and political integration. Since a particularly interesting effect of the            
European integration is its impact on linguistic diversity by ‘compelling’ or exposing            
languages into greater contact not just to complement but also to compete one another              
within the EU institutions and in Europe, the principle of natural selection, therefore,             
seems the most natural, effective, and ‘invisible force’ or explanation that sorts out the              
languages by placing each in its ‘right place’ or in a hierarchy of useful worth. As                
Graddol (1997:36) explains, for instance, “The English language flows into other           
languages, which adopt English words and phrases. English also ‘colonises’ the space of             
other languages by taking over certain communicative domains.”  
4.6 Survey of language usage in the EU 
Below is a sample Eurostat report on the complementary and competing demand for              
some languages within the EU educational institutions from 2005-2011 to demonstrate           
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the dynamics that are playing out within the emerging new linguistic situation that creates              
a ‘pecking order.’ 
On primary education 
Within primary education a clear majority of pupils (choose to) study English.            
Indeed, learning English is mandatory in several countries within secondary          
education institutions, and so a number of EU Member States have close to 100 %               
of pupils learning this language already in primary education... The highest shares            
of primary education pupils studying English in 2011 were recorded in Malta,            
Spain, Austria, Italy, Greece, Croatia and Poland, with more than nine out of             
every ten children studying English; this was also the case in Liechtenstein,            
Norway and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The relative          
importance of English as a foreign language may be further magnified because            
pupils tend to receive more instruction in their first foreign language than they do              
for any subsequent languages they (choose to) study. 
Many of the central and eastern European Member States that joined the EU in              
2004 and 2007 were characterised by the fact that learning Russian was            
compulsory in the past. This situation has changed rapidly and these days most             
pupils have more choice concerning the language(s) they wish to study. In most of              
these countries there has been a marked increase in the proportion of pupils             
learning English, often above 50 % of all students, and in Bulgaria and Lithuania              
over 70 % in 2011, with the peak over 90 % in Poland (as already noted above). 
Luxembourg is also of particular interest, insofar as there are three official            
languages, with most pupils receiving instruction in Luxembourgish, German and          
French at primary level; English is only introduced at secondary school. A similar             
situation is observed in Belgium, with the focus in primary schools on learning             
French or Dutch (depending on the community and/or region), rather than           
English. 
 
Apart from Luxembourg, the only other EU Member State where more than one             
quarter of primary school children learnt French as a foreign language was in the              
United Kingdom, where this share exceeded two thirds (69.6 %). German is the             
main foreign language taught to all primary school children in Luxembourg, while            
more than one fifth of primary children were taught German in 2011 in Greece,              
Croatia and Hungary. 
 
On secondary education 
Turning to language learning in upper secondary school... some 93.8 % of all             
EU-28 students at ISCED level 3 were studying English as a foreign language in              61
61 ​ISCED: International standard classification of education ​‘is an instrument for compiling 
internationally comparable education statistics. The ISCED 97 version covers two classification 
variables: levels and fields of education as well as general/vocational/prevocational orientation and 
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2011, compared with slightly less than one quarter (23.0 %) studying French and             
slightly more than one fifth (21.1 %) studying German. Between 2006 and 2011,             
the proportion of students at ISCED level 3 in the EU-27 studying English             
increased slightly (up 0.7 percentage points), while the proportions studying          
French and German fell 7.7 and 13.8 percentage points respectively. 
 
Luxembourg and the Czech Republic stood out as the countries with the highest             
proportion (100 %) of secondary education students (at ISCED level 3) learning            
two or more languages in 2011, while there were also shares above 90 % recorded               
in Finland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia (2008 data), Sweden and          
France; note this indicator includes all foreign languages, not just German,           
English and French. 
 
Source: Eurostat 2015: ‘Foreign language learning statistics’ 
And since the average foreign language learned by each student is about two, and                
since the first foreign language of choice is English, and since no other EU language               
constantly follows second place to English in every country, therefore, this means that the              
other major languages: namely, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian are second            
foreign language choices only in their respective regions of influence. Meaning, they are             
simply regional languages and are not as spread as English has become. As noted by               
Kachru (1992) for languages under similar situations,  
The spread of one language in relation to others is a phenomenon which             
presumably goes far back in human history as the existence of a multiplicity of              
languages. Certainly, it is documented as far back as written records go; e.g., in              
the second millennium B.C., Akkadian replaced Sumerian but the speech          
community retained the latter in certain learned uses. Also, it is a familiar             
phenomenon for one language to serve as a lingua franca or language of special              
functions (religious, commercial) over a large area of many languages: Sanskrit,           
Greek, Latin, Arabic, and French are examples at various periods and in different             
parts of the world. But there has never before been a single language which              
spread for such purposes over ​most of the world, as English has done in this               
century. (p. xv)  
 
educational/labour market destination. ISCED 97 was implemented in the European Union (EU) for 
collecting data starting with the 1997/98 school year.’ 
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And since the language that is the dominant choice for today’s young generation              
becomes the language of the future, and given the present trend, therefore, it is              
predictable that English would be the language of the future for Europe. 
4.7 The growing use of English and the relative decline of others in Europe 
 
I now examine the rise of English and its relationship with the national languages in                
Europe. Obviously, since both French and German are two highly developed, well            
protected and prestigious national, regional and international languages on their own           
rights, and since from a purely linguistic perspective no language is inherently superior to              
another and are identical on all levels of abstraction (a Chomskyan conception),            
‘something much bigger than a simplistic conception of power relations must be            
involved’, to repeat after Crystal (1997). The replacement of the Russian language in             
Eastern Europe for English, the relative and steady decline in the use of two major               
European languages, French and German, within the very Pan-European institutions they           
co-founded  has raised understandably some interesting questions and concerns.   62
The table below illustrates the rise of English and the relative decline of French and                
German in written use within the European Union institutions over a 14-year period. 
Table 6​: ‘Languages of primary texts produced by the European Commission (in %)’ 
             ​French     English     German     Other 
1986       58            26              11           5 
1989       49            30              9             12 
1991       48            35              6             11 
1996       38.5         44.7           5.1          11.7 
1997       40.4         45.3           5.4           8.9 
1998       37            48              5              10 
62 “​In 1958, legislation specified German, French, Italian and Dutch as the official and working 
languages of the ​European Union’s (EU)​ predecessor, the European Communities”.  
90 
1999       35            52              5               8 
(source: Truchot, 2002)  
In this table, the increasing use of the English language over time is closely correlated               
with the declining use of both French and German, the two main international languages              
at a competition with English. That is, the evidence shows some systematic correlation             
between the progress of economic integration and political centralization and the           
emergence of a linguistic hierarchy. It indicates that economic and political integration            
involving countries with different languages can have significant linguistic consequences.          
In other words, despite EI being initially a Franco-German project, and despite the fact              
that the first official language policy of the then European Community (EC) identified             
French, German, Italian, and Dutch only as the working and official languages of the EC               
(EU), English is now the dominant integrative language. The fact that English has been              
diminishing their functions in the EU institutions and European society in general imply             
that some of the consequences of integration are fundamental and unintended. In fact,             
this has been happening in spite of deliberate efforts aimed at slowing down the pace and                
changing the trend - perhaps, teaching us one or two things on the behavior of culture                
change discussed in Section I.  
In an article written by Amelia Gentleman (2004), ‘French-language fightback as            
English colonizes EU,’ she reported that despite efforts to reduce the impact of the              
increased use of English, France is achieving the opposite results:  
T​he creation of the school in Avignon reflects mounting anxiety in Paris that the              
EU - originally a primarily French body, with its main headquarters in            
Francophone countries, formed along the lines of French administrative         
structures, with French as its core language - is drifting further from its roots with               
every expansion. Between 1997 and 2002, the use of French in European council             
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documents, for example, dropped 24% while there was a 32% rise in English. A              
survey of officials from the new member states this year showed that almost 70%              
had English as their second language.  
 
A trend that is expected to rise as more young people learn English than they do in other                  
languages in schools as already noted which is also ​consistent with a ​Eurobarometer             
Special Surveys conducted in 2001  which found, among other things, that:  63
The foreign language to be spoken by most young Europeans is, without surprise,             
English. One young person out of two (whose mother tongue is not English)             
declares having a sufficient knowledge of the language to take part in a             
conversation. This is more or less the same percentage as in 1997 (54 %) but               
noticeable more than in 1990 (42 %) and in 1987 (34 %). In other words, English                
is steadily becoming the young Europeans lingua franca.  
 
And as if to make matters more challenging for the French and German languages, the                
Survey also notes that “As in 1997, Spanish is the foreign language young people (29%)               
would prefer to learn.” That is, it is Spanish which is surprisingly becoming the second,               
second language preferred by young Europeans besides English. Therefore, it is safe to             
state or even predict that English is being selected for and shall be the lingua franca                
within the European Union. In part, this is because, as Kachru (1990:98) noted, “the              
planning for the spread of English is steadily passing into the hands of its non-native               
users” and is therefore nearly unstoppable or irreversible unless some extraordinary           
opposing event like a total disintegration of the EU took place. ​Girod (2011) puts the               
effect already felt by some languages as the result of a correlation:  
It's been indisputable for some time that English is becoming the ‘universal            
language.’ As the number of living languages has steadily decreased, the use of             
English has expanded on every continent. And though English has not — despite             
predictions — crushed all other languages (German, Russian, and Spanish, to cite            
the prime examples, all remain strong), one language does seem to be undergoing             
the predicted cataclysmic collapse. English may not yet have won the globe, but             
63 YOUNG EUROPEANS IN 2001 Results of a European opinion poll: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_151_summ_en.pdf  
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French has definitely lost it.  64
 
All this demonstrates that the power or influence of a language involves more than a                
complex interplay of hegemonic factors derived from the economic, political, and           
cultural power matrix of its speakers. It shows sociolinguistic factors such as the range of               
functions a language has, all have made English the best suited for a common language in                
Europe. This also demonstrates that the coercive or language imposition thesis often            
applied to explain the spread of English outside of Europe cannot fully account for the               
language’s relative success in Europe where it actually faces other successful, European,            
international, and former imperial languages such as French, German, Spanish, Italian,           
and Russian and on their home countries. 
Therefore, while rejecting the linguistic imperialism theory of Phillipson (1992)           
directly for the success of English in Europe, I argue that it's phenomenal spread there is                
due, in large measure, to two major factors: 1/ its global success that compels most               
Europeans to communicate with non-Europeans in English, and 2/ its use or            
appropriation as the ‘neutral’, common denominator language - the most common reason            
for a lingua franca, as noted earlier. In other words, we accept Crystal’s argument that               
English now plays the most crucial and needed role in international communication. 
4.8 The future linguistic situation in Europe and the future of English 
The paper sought to demonstrate that there is a link between the process of economic                
and political integration and changes on the linguistic situation in Europe as shown by the               
evolution of a new linguistic hierarchy and by the growing use of English the common               
64 The French government has also been fighting back: in 1994, through its Toubon Law, the 
government mandated the use of the French language in official government publications. 
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language in Europe. The sociolinguistic evidence presented made a strong case that the             
harmonizing and homogenizing dynamics of the economic, political, and social          
integration in Europe have a significant impact on linguistic diversity. The evidence has             
shown that the new linguistic situation and the spread of English in Europe are the               
consequence of the dynamic, expansive EI process.  
Consequently, when modeling the continent’s evolving sociolinguistic trajectory, the          
most predictable in time according to the analyses presented in this paper will be the               
gradual evolution of a linguistic pecking order, accompanied by an increasing language            
convergence whereby languages become more similar to each other, and the emergence            
of a new continent-wide English variety with the distinctive characteristics of the broader             
macro-cultural context and overall sociolinguistic situation of Europe. That is, according           
to a model of transition from speaker innovation to linguistic change (James and Lesley              
Milroy, 1997:51). In the future, English will be, therefore, the most used language for              
intra-EU-wide communications in which it performs the different roles and functions as a             
mother tongue to some, a second language for many, and a lingua franca for most. Below                
is a joke that has aptly captured a model summary of how the new European English                
variety most likely would evolve:  
The European Commission has just announced an agreement whereby English          
will be the official language of the EU rather than German which was the other               
possibility. 
As part of the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government conceded that English           
spelling had some room for improvement and has accepted a five year phase-in             
plan that would be known as "Euro-English". 
In the first year, "s" will replace the soft "c". Sertainly, this will make the sivil                
servants jump with joy. The hard "c" will be dropped in favour of the "k". This                
should klear up konfusion and keyboards kan have 1 less letter. 
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There will be growing publik enthusiasm in the sekond year, when the            
troublesome "ph" will be replaced with "f". This will make words like "fotograf"             
20% shorter. 
In the 3rd year, publik akseptanse of the new spelling kan be ekspekted to reach               
the stage where more komplikated changes are possible. Governments will          
enkorage the removal of double letters, which have always ben a deterent to             
akurate speling. Also, al wil agre that the horible mes of the silent "e"s in the                
language is disgraseful, and they should go away. 
By the fourth year, peopl wil be reseptiv to steps such as replasing "th" with "z"                
and "w" with "v". During ze fifz year, ze unesesary "o" kan be dropd from vords                
kontaining "ou" and similar changes vud of kors be aplid to ozer kombinations of              
leters. 
After zis fifz yer, ve vil hav a reli sensibl riten styl. Zer vil be no mor trubl or                   
difikultis and evrivun vil find it ezi to understand ech ozer. Ze drem vil finali kum                
tru! And zen world!  65
 
This is in fact not a joke anymore but an evolved reality that the European Union form                  
of English is differing from other recognized varieties of English, including its use of              
“words that do not exist or are relatively unknown to native English speakers outside the               
EU institutions .” For instance, in EU English, the word “‘action’ is used countably as a               66
synonym for ‘scheme,’ ‘project’ or ‘measure,’ the latter are preferable.” And the            67
purported German influence in the emerging English variety in Europe can be explained             
by the fact that Germany remains the most important European country both regarding             
the size of its population of native speakers as well as the size and influence of its                 










This section IV and section III have therefore shown that there is indeed a causal link                 
between the process of European integration and the ongoing overall changes within the             
sociolinguistic situation in Europe. The next section concludes the paper with some            
summary discussion on current events such the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the Greek crisis,             











V. Conclusion:  
Speakers give up their language gradually and       
knowingly (and even to a degree voluntarily) as its         
functions are taken over by a more powerful rival.         
This typically occurs after an extended period of        
bilingualism, during which there is a reduction of        
the social functions and in consequence the       
grammatical and lexical complexity, of the dying       
language.  Herbert Schendl (2001) 
 
If the sociology of language is preoccupied with        
language presence/usage in terms of social      
functions and roles, as well as the environmental        
forces of change that influence these roles, then it         
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may be argued that some sort of program of control          
or planning should be applied to influence the        
course of events.  Grant D. McConnell (1997) 
 
The EU’s founding treaty states that EU citizens        
have the right to communicate with the EU        
institutions in the official language of their choice,        
and to receive a reply in the same language. ~          
European Commission  
 
5.1  Summary of the present study 
The aim of the thesis has been: ​to examine the effect of economic integration and               
political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English              
language in Europe. The paper has offered an overview of the state of European              
integration and has concluded that there is a dynamic, causal link between the process of               
economic and political integration and the evolving linguistic situation in Europe as            
shown by these significant developments:  
● growing complementarity in language choice and use, 
● increasing competition in language choice and use, 
● the gradual evolution of a linguistic hierarchy, and 
● the emergence of English as a common language  
From the start I realized, in making a descriptive and analytic assessment on such a topic                
within a vast field in such a short thesis, it was necessary to be more selective in what I                   
wished to describe, analyze, and explain. However, in order to avoid viewing European             
integration in too narrow and shallow a fashion, I chose to consider the question in a                
rather broader, richer, and macro context by drawing on anthropological insights as well             
as from the economic and political science approaches on the structure and behavior of              
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political and socio-cultural systems. 
I have therefore incorporated different methods and ideas in the presentation than is              
commonly attempted in a similar paper which has allowed me to situate, analyze, and              
interpret the current, evolving linguistic situation in Europe in a transformational context            
showing that it is both triggered by and entirely consistent with the overall economic and               
political integration process. Section I introduced some of the literature’s pertinent           
insights and approaches on the study of the behavior of dynamic systems more generally              
while Section II reviewed the evolution and structure of the EU process and system in               
particular from the 1950s to the present as typically discussed in more recent studies              
showing the interactive links between the economic and political spheres that determine            
the system's underlying behavior. And, Sections III and IV analyzed the reactive            
sociolinguistic field especially concerning the emerging linguistic hierarchy as well as the            
growing role being played by English as the leading integrative and shared language in              
Europe respectively. The evidence shows that, on the whole, the economic and political             
variable forces of change that influence the process have a significant impact as             
languages complement and compete with one another in various formal and informal            
contexts within an evolving pecking order in accordance with the principles of            
equilibrium, economy, and subsidiarity. The paper found the development of this           
linguistic hierarchy and with it the movement toward a de facto lingua franca to be a                
fundamental effect or aspect of the overall process as it provides the necessary             
sociolinguistic adjustment.  
As the evidence in the three-sphere - the economic-political-sociolinguistics -           
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macro-analytic framework has shown, the parallel and dependent process of change           
within the sociolinguistic sphere, also governed by the dynamics of harmony, economy,            
and subsidiarity is a necessary consequence of the economic and political integration            
process. The evidence does not indicate the causality runs in the reverse: changes within              
the linguistic situation is the effect. A common language can facilitate but does not              
necessarily lead to economic integration or political union; the Arabic language in the             
Middle East, or Spanish in South America, for example, have not fostered closer             
integration among member states sharing them in common. On the other hand, economic             
and political integration, beyond a certain level, leads to cultural integration as well that              
increases the demand for and the emergence of a common language; Recently, the             
Russian language within the ex-Soviet Union, and now English in the European Union,             
for instance. The analysis has confirmed that economic and political integration within            
linguistically diverse and highly open societies causally leads to linguistic integration as            
well and thus the process of integration can indeed predict the future linguistic situation:              
the more closely integrated Europe become, the more well-defined would be the            
emergent hierarchy of languages in terms of which languages are utilized for what             
functions. That is, developments in the sociolinguistic area are systematically related and            
consistent with the economic and political integration process and thus can serve as a              
leading indicator for the overall process. A total disintegration of the integration like the              
Soviet Union, for instance, or a partial slowing of the process such as signaled by ‘Brexit’                
(the abbreviation for Britain's (UK) exit from the EU can also affect the direction of the                
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process of a sociolinguistic situation or regime. As a recent survey (2013) about the              68
effect of economic crisis on culture within the EU indicates, “A comparison with the              
2007 survey shows that, across the EU, there has been a decline in participation in the                
majority of activities asked about, which may reflect an overall reduction in the amount              
of money or time EU citizens spend on cultural activities since the economic crisis              
began.” 
5.2 Globalization, the dynamics of integration, and crisis  
In sections I and II, globalization and its far-reaching effects were viewed as a               69
distant exogenous variable on the movement toward regionalism generally and toward           
European integration in particular. It was also noted in Section II that, as a result of the                 
vast opportunities and constraints presented by globalization, few European countries had           
either the desire or the capacity to go it alone in what sometimes seems a hostile global                 
environment where great cultural and political powers like Russia, China, the US and             
some powerful multinational entities are major players. Hence, among other things, the            
need and call for European integration. As examined in Section II, the ‘periodic’ crises              
within the EU whether it be political, economic, or institutional have almost always being              
addressed by commitments for further integration whose rationale or argument, I have            
explained, is that solving current problems or challenges also require addressing           
structurally related areas that are yet to be integrated into the overall process. I              70
68 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_399_sum_en.pdf 
69 ‘What does globalization have to do with the erosion of welfare states? Sorting out the issues’ 
ARENA Working Paper 17/1996, Andrew Martin. 
 




discussed the ‘spillover thesis’ as the mechanism of problem-solving that brings about            
further integration. It argues that in effect, European integration has been a slow process              
of progress often mired with periodic crises and that until it reached to a certain level of                 
comprehensive political, economic, industrial, monetary, financial, fiscal, legal, labor,         
cultural, etc. integration, major disruptive crises were still bound to occur - again and              
again just as the current eurozone crisis affecting Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, etc. and              
the ones before that. In fact, the ‘spillover thesis’ predicts such crises since the dynamics               
between areas not yet integrated (and there are still many) and the ones that are               
integrated, are some of the primary sources for such crisis or tension. That is because it is                 
through such tensions or crises that policy makers are compelled to act and that it is by                 
addressing the current crises such as the debt crisis that (formerly) unintegrated areas             
such as fiscal policy become integrated.  
5.3 Roots of Brexit and the Greek debt crisis - and the call for more reform 
​European integration of the kind envisioned by its architects requires compromise            
between national sovereignty of Member States and more EU. And except for European             
countries that are not part of the EU, the UK has been the most reluctant to engage in the                   
trade-offs considered necessary between sovereignty for a cohesive, stronger EU. This           
explains why even before its formal decision to leave the EU on June 23, 2016, the UK                 
was not in the Eurozone monetary union, not a member of the Schengen passport-free              
movement agreement, and was not in favor of building a joint European defense, among              
others. In other words, the UK has always been a one-foot-in, one-foot-out Member State              
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in the EU; its only notable achievement for any EU-wide project has been the promotion               
of the English language in Europe - which is now the most widely spoken second               
language in the EU . Its decision for leaving the EU is hence mainly for political reasons                71
- which is, to remain unbound from EU rules and regulations for which there are               
incentives but also costs . For instance, Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, “said             72
she wanted to ‘operate’ within the EU's single market, yet end free movement of people               
and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice”, whereas President Hollande, the             
French President, has said that “There must be a threat, there must be a risk, there must                 
be a price. Otherwise, we will be in a negotiation that cannot end well.”  73
Brexit’s most likely effect on the EU is a further and deeper integration for the rest of                  
the EU in areas not yet integrated such as a collective defense , a single foreign minister,                74
the extension of the Schengen borders outward, common fiscal policy, etc. As noted in              
the postscript, Brexit would have little to no adverse effect on the role and status of the                 
English language in Europe whose propagation is already now in the hands of its              
71 “Teaching English. Testing proficiency. Supporting learning”: ​https://www.britishcouncil.org/english  
72 “Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, suggests UK will not have access to 






74“The Implications of Brexit for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy”: 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-brexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-security-and-defenc









As for the Greek crisis, like the Portuguese and Italian ones, however, it is a different                 
kind of crisis from that of the UK which is mostly a political act that is beyond the mere                   
concerns of human migration and social costs. The Greek crisis is mainly an economic,              
debt crisis which is the result, among some domestic factors, of structural imbalances             
within the EU-wide integration structure which advantaged economically stronger         
members at the expense of the relatively weaker ones. Greece became Europe’s most             
acute debt crisis center for reasons also related to the contagious linkages of the global               
economic implosion in 2008. In their recent studies, Daianu, D'Adda, Basevi, and Kumar             
(2014), described the root of the crisis as “a flawed design and inadequate policy              
arrangements, which have invited rising imbalances among EU member states.” That is,            75
the eurozone crisis is merely an acute form of ‘structural, trading imbalances’ of capital              
and labor markets that are also the result of the uneven dynamics within the EU-global               
political economy.  
In short, beyond the normal weaknesses of some of the southern economies, thus what               
became Greek pains and Spain’s losses turned out as gains for the German economy ,              76
for instance. Eriksen put it this way: “The EU’s member states, and in particular the               
Eurozone members, have moved themselves into a community of fate through lock-ins            
and normative commitments. Mending the Eurozone crisis has become a matter of            
justice, as some are profiting and some losing on the European Monetary Union.             
75 ​http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/the-eurozone-crisis-and-the-future-of-europe/  
76 Germany government gained from Greek crisis - IWH study: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33845836 
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However, there is disagreement as to what medicine is the right cure.” And the              77
interactions between the Greek financial institutions, the European Central Bank, and the            
IMF to resolve the crisis have only managed to postpone a resolution since the              
interventions merely act as an effort of shifting potential losses from private international             
creditors to ones of public European governments. Thus, the austerity measures for the             
Greek economy were no more than efforts aimed at squeezing national resources and             
funds as much as is practically possible for private and public debt servicing as is               
typically done in third world countries. The “joint European Union-IMF €110 billion            
financing package to help the country ride out its debt crisis, revive growth, and              
modernize the economy” as noted by the IMF has been understood as effectively             78
meaning a joint EU-IMF financial support to help pay off private international creditors.  
And as noted in Section II, the history of European integration indicates that further               
integration that incorporates the financial, the fiscal, and other not yet integrated areas is              
the next logical and likely step; neither a return to national currencies nor restrictive              
measures to protect domestic markets can be the practical solution. As Kathleen R.             
McNamara, Associate Professor of Government & International Affairs, Georgetown         
University (2010), puts it, “The history of the EU shows that crisis often—but not              
always—leads to increased integration.” That is, according to the way the EU has been              79
constructed thus far, it will be more integration - not less integration - since the alternate                
77 ‘The Normative Implications of the Eurozone Crisis’. 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/2014/wp2-14.html 
 
78 IMF Approves €30 Bln Loan for Greece on Fast Track: 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew050910a 
 
79 ​http://www.cfr.org/world/eurocrisis-uncertain-future-european-integration/p22933  
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solutions would be far more costly and therefore less likely options. This is because not               
only are the national economies interdependent but also the unintegrated areas are all             
dynamically related with the ones already integrated and the ‘spillover thesis’ strongly            
suggests the integration of these yet unintegrated areas in the future. This is how the               
European Commission head, Jean-Claude Juncker, said it recently on Sept. 14, 2016:            
“The European Union still does not have enough union. There are splits out there and               
often fragmentation where we need further union, that is leaving space for galloping             
populism.”  80
5.4 International political and economic crisis and the refugee problem in Europe  
The very causes of the refugee crisis globally and in Europe particularly has its roots                
in the geopolitical dynamics of political conflicts and economic downturns and hence is             
beyond the aim of this paper to directly address exhaustively. Thus, only a cursory              
overview of the effect of the refugee crisis on the dynamics of the integration process and                
its impact on the sociolinguistic situation in Europe is discussed. Hence, a few things can               
be said on the refugee influx in Europe, its causes, and some of the ways to address it.  
First, the refugee’s problem is not just a European crisis; it is a global one. Second, the                  
European refugee crisis is mainly the result of Sub-Saharan Africa, North African, and             
Middle Eastern refugees influx driven by conflicts in which the major European powers             
such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy are participatory actors. Third, the refugees              






no refugees, is in a deep political and economic crisis of its own as noted and the refugees                  
simply exacerbate the problem. The European Commission , citing the UNHCR as its            81
source, puts the global refugee crisis in perspective. 
The world is facing an unprecedented displacement crisis. Today, more than 65            
million people are forcibly displaced as a result of violent conflicts and natural             
disasters. 
In 2015, over 1 million people – refugees, displaced persons, and other migrants –              
have made their way to the EU, either escaping conflict in their country and in               
search of better economic prospects. While the numbers have shown a decreasing            
trend in 2016, by June around 156 000 people have reached Europe.  
 
And with this, it can only be added that, in the short term, each EU country will                 
experience a different refugees impact either because of proximity to the migration            
source such as Italy and Greece are or owing to the attraction of a national economy such                 
as Germany is. However, in the long-term, the most likely step to address this crisis or                
future such crises would be a collective response that shifts either partial or the whole               
control of national borders from Member States to an EU-wide external borders control             
mechanism that would be a further integration.  
As for the refugees’ impact on the sociolinguistic situation, no major effects or              
changes to the already outlined trajectory is expected since most of the refugees have              
English as their international language of communication. That is, if anything, the            
refugees will more likely help elevate the already growing status of the English language              
in Europe as explained in sections III and IV. For instance, even though immigrant              
refugee children upon arrival in Germany receive German language training, one cannot            
fail to notice that the foreign language skills they display is not German as shown by the                 
81 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en 
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English vocabulary of a young Syrian refugee, Muhammad: “‘Melon, bananas, and           
cherries!’” (Sumi Somaskanda, 2015)    82
Since the aim of the thesis has been ​to examine the effect of economic integration and                 
political unity on linguistic diversity and the new function and status of the English              
language in Europe,​ I will now conclude with a summary discussion and suggestion of ​a               
therefore minimalist model of political strategy on language policy. 
5.5 Summary discussion on relations between the EU’s integration strategies,          
linguistic diversity, and the language policy challenges 
In order to show causal relations to better help suggest a more practical approach to                
language policy options, the organization of the paper and its sections have been             
intentionally structured around: 
●  the nature of the behavior of socio-cultural systems,  
● the structure and development of European integration,  
● the history and evolution of the contemporary linguistic situations of Europe,  
● and the reactions to the effects on language choices and use, 
with the aim of gaining valuable insights on the process in order to meaningfully help               
address some of the concerns on the present linguistic situation particularly concerning            
the developing issues and policy considerations on a practical language regime for the             
EU. In my view, it would be a mistake to design and set in motion a language policy for                   





economic, political, and social integration - since language and other cultural           
differences, when promoted to a certain level, can and do become obstacles to economic              
efficiency, political unity as well as other negative social conditions. 
The idea that countries should proceed to protect and promote their respective             
languages and cultural identities while simultaneously seeking an ‘ever closer’ economic,           
political, and social union can be regarded as a fundamental contradiction since            
promotions of differences and diversities within an integrating, open, and common space            
to some degree can and do undermine cohesive unity that is being sought through a               
people's Union. And since this tension between the commitment to diversity on one hand              
and the need and call for integration on the other and the necessity to reconcile the two                 
has been a source of active policy considerations and frustrations within the EU project,              
this paper addresses, therefore, two basic and broad strategies that can be considered,             
each with its own costs and merits: ​a managed multilingual regime vs. a self-generated              
language hierarchy. 
5.5. A managed multilingual regime vs a self-generated language hierarchy​. 
First, the EU can either choose to intervene through a combination of strategies and               
policies based on some protections and incentives on behalf of languages viewed or             
recognized as in need of special assistance. “For instance, the Saami languages of             
northern Finland, Sweden, Norway and the Kola Peninsula (Russia) have only a few             
hundred speakers in some communities and are in danger of dying out.” Second, or it               83
can choose to let languages compete and complement one another, in accordance with the              
83 ​http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/regional-minority-languages_en.htm  
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Darwinian model, based on the principle of demand and supply in which free market              
forces determine the use and luck of each language. 
The first strategy, the choice to intervene through a combination of language policies              
based on special guarantees so that all EU citizens can communicate and receive official              
information through their languages, has the merit of maintaining the essential link            
between the citizens and their EU institutions. Furthermore, the use of all languages in              
official communications while costly and may be administratively inefficient makes the           
EU not only apparently transparent but a more inclusive and legitimate institution in the              
eyes of the citizens. The downside of this first strategy is that policymakers would have               
to bear its associated costs as well as forego the merits of the second strategy.  
The second approach, letting free market forces determine the fortune of each             
language, entails possible and practical consequences that could be considered as both            
politically ‘unacceptable’ and socially ‘undesirable’ including the decreasing use of some           
languages with the resultant losses of certain domains of language use for others, among              
others. For other languages, exclusion from official use not only would affect those who              
use them but it also may threaten the languages’ very long term status, vitality, and even                
survival since their speakers would be increasingly drawn to adopt the languages chosen             
for official communication. Moreover, excluding languages from official communication         
not only contradicts the EU language policy and law as it is, it could also prevent some                 84
speakers from communicating in the languages of their choice with the effect that they              
would be either unable or unwilling to fully participate in the political process as active               
84 ​‘The Treaty of Rome and Regulation 1/1958 stipulates that all EU languages are to be treated on an equal 
basis with respect to publication of official EU documents and that EU citizens have the right to 
communicate with EU institutions in an EU language of their choice.’ 
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citizens. Furthermore, limiting the official or working languages to just a few or one              
would be not only a violation of the EU language laws, but it would also serve to                 
adversely restrict access to information resources for those whose languages have been            
excluded as well as alienate those who personally and culturally identify with them.  
However, its upside, letting the market decide, means official communication would            
be streamlined, financially less costly, more efficient, and less complicated. That is, given             
that the EU institutions and corporate businesses spend much time and resources on             
communication through the multiplicity of languages as required by law , the free            85
market strategy would provide not only greater efficiency but also financial savings on all              
language-related matters. Moreover, it would minimize the technical complications that          
often result from constant translation, interpretation, and storage of published materials.           
And it is also through the efficient market mechanism - that is, the Darwinian model -                
that an ‘optimal number’ of working languages in the EU, whether it is just one, two, or                 
three, etc. can be possible, produced, and maintained.  
These conflicting considerations for “a managed multilingual regime” versus “a           
self-generated language hierarchy” situations have been highlighted simply in order to           
acknowledge the difficulty and complexity on some of the key sociopolitical issues at             
hand and how to formulate a sociolinguistically neutral, efficient policy strategy with            
minimal costs. 
These are, therefore, the two practical options available to the EU language policy              
85 ​‘​Article 217. The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without                
prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the                   
Council, acting unanimously.’ 
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planners. And as noted, there are both the benefits of plurality requiring the maintenance              
of diversity and benefits around integration requiring the promotion of unity and            
homogeneity. The two, diversity and unity, while not mutually exclusive forces and are             
of benefit together within limits, when pressed beyond a certain degree in opposite             
directions, however, could pose an inherent risk of fundamentally undermining each           
other and their system. As Clyne (1997) has noted, the optimal option in multilingual              
societies is a delicate balance that takes into account the social, political, economic, and              
sociolinguistic needs:  
Language policies… and or community attitudes may enforce, support, accept,          
tolerate, or reject multilingualism or give special status to one or more than one              
language. Where language policies have been formulated to promote         
multilingualism, the motivation may be: Social - in the interest of equity for all              
groups; Cultural - to facilitate cultural maintenance; Political - to ensure the            
participation of all groups and / or gain their electoral support; Economic - to be               
able to harness language assets to the advantage of the country’s balance of             
payments.” Singapore, for instance, has three major ethnic groups - Chinese,           
Indians, and Malays but it has four official languages Mandarin, Tamil, Malay            
respectively and English which serves as the language of interethnic and           
international communication. (p. 303) 
 
5.6 Integration, linguistic diversity and suggestion for ​a therefore minimalist model           
of political strategy on language policy 
As noted above, it is argued for good reasons that introducing any limited set of                
languages or a single language regime in the EU challenges the rights to information              
access and language use for many people and it poses the problem of which languages or                
language to choose for some: whether it should be English which is already the language               
most widely understood and used in the EU, German which has the most native speakers               
in the EU, French which was the most widely used for EU-level internal communications              
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purposes though now in sharp decline, or some other. Thus, admittedly, choosing any set              
of languages or language has the potential to stir protest because of the fact that language                
issues remain inherently sensitive and divisive; and some people would be strongly            
against the promotion of any language unless it is one’s own that is chosen. And since                
there are 24 EU official languages at present the choice could get even more              86
complicated and less practical than the case with Singapore where only four languages             
are involved, for instance.  
However, since the vast majority of EU official documents already get prepared first              
in English before translation into others, it seems reasonable that Europe ​should promote             
national language policies that align with such practical, evolving communications needs           
of the EU institutions if it is to remain integrated and united similar to the existing                
‘controlled full multilingualism’ which requires that a European Parliament document          
that is drafted in any language need not necessarily be translated directly into all other               
languages automatically but only to the most widely used relay languages first: English,             
French or German. This practical approach increases efficiency, streamlines work,          
reduces workload while allowing an adaptive language policy serving all EU citizens to             
emerge efficiently, naturally, and minimally.  
And the all-inclusive language policy while a popular and should remain a key              
objective, the current official multilingual regime of language equality before the law            
need be only in principle through a transitory phase during which the evolving language              
86‘​Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek,           
Hungarian, Italian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian,           
Spanish and Swedish.’ 
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hierarchy whose nature and merits is discussed above is allowed to ‘naturally’ adapt             
itself. As Crystal ​(2003) ​noted, such a policy of language hierarchy is, in fact, essential               
for multilingual existence and maintenance. 
Arguments about the need for national or cultural identity are often seen as being              
opposed to those about the need for mutual intelligibility. But this is misleading.             
It is perfectly possible to develop a situation in which intelligibility and identity             
happily co-exist. The situation is the familiar one of bilingualism - but a             
bilingualism where one of the languages within a speaker is the global language,             
providing access to the world community, and the other is a well-resourced            
regional language, providing access to a local community. The two functions can            
be seen as complementary, responding to different needs. And it is because the             
functions are so different that a world of linguistic diversity can in principle             
continue to exist in a world united by a common language. (p. 22)  
  
5.7 The any-three-language set option model for any European 
This paper, therefore, suggests a three-language hierarchy optimal combinations for           
every EU speaker analogous to Kachru’s concentric circles on the uses of English as a               
global language. I have adapted his idea to formulate a linguistic situation of ​any              
three-language set option for any European​  as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Any three-language model for any European 
That is, for each person, the inner circle (A) represents ‘national languages’ (nl) one of               
which is spoken as mother tongue, the outer circle (B) for the ‘regional languages’ (rl)               
one of which is spoken as national language, and the expanding circle (C) for the ‘EU’s                
common language(s)’ (cl) spoken as the language(s) understood by most people. In this             
way, knowing at least one language in each circle enables anyone to understand and be               
understood by everyone in Europe. Thus, one need to speak only one or at the most three                 
languages for successful communication with others in Europe. A Belgian who speaks            
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Dutch as mother tongue, French or German as regional language and English as the              
common European language (CEL) would, for example, be able to communicate with            
other Europeans who also speak any three European languages within their concentric            
circles such as someone in Spain who speaks Catalan as mother tongue, Spanish as the               
regional language and English as the common language - where their common language             
is English. As shown in Sections III and IV, English is already the de facto common                
language as illustrated by Fenyo (2003) in figure 3 following Berns (1995) who adapted              
Kachru’s model of world Englishes for Europe. 
 
Figure 3. The concentric circles of European Englishes  
In brief, I suggest two strategies on language policies for ​a minimalist model of               
political strategy on language policy​ : 1/ ​Transitional Policies and 2/ Adaptive Policies.            
The transitory policies are temporary measures and may permit or even require a limited              
intervention of sorts for some languages for some time while the later are long-term,              
process-adaptive policies to allow the linguistic situation to continuously adjust itself to            
the overall condition of the integration process as it unfolds. Since ​language issues or              
conflicts are mostly indications of ‘other’ broader and deeper economic, political,           
historical, or cultural issues or grievances in society, t​his paper also recommends robust             
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policy ​measures that address the perception or reality of these other non-language,            
negative considerations such as discrimination, prejudice, and alienation of people.  
5.8 Conclusion  
 
Finally, in carrying out this research on the evolution of the European Union, I have                 
tested some key theories of social science. Through the three-sphere macro-analytic           
framework I have developed here, I have found the relationships between the economic,             
political, and sociolinguistic areas to be dynamic and causal with correlated development            
and different speeds in the same direction. Though the paper did not deal in depth with                
the many detailed aspects of language behavior, the recommendations put forward for            
policy strategies are, however, based on the nature of the co-relationships between the             
political, economic, and sociolinguistic variables that are highly consistent with the           
general systems behavior and systemic change, technology-led change, economic         
primacy, spillover mechanism, and the Darwinian model - which I have set forth in              
Section I and referenced throughout the paper.  
And while this thesis isn’t claiming to have uncovered new insights during the               
theories validating process, I have nevertheless gained a better understanding of the            
relevant links between the economic, political, and sociolinguistic aspects as          
conceptualized in the three-spheres model analyses framework allowing me to accept the            
conclusions arrived at with good confidence. I therefore encourage further studies of            
similar approach to improve and formalize the concept of a therefore minimalist model of              
political strategy on language policy developed here for Europe in order to formulate             





‘In 1958, the then European Economic Community       
passed a Regulation naming Dutch, French, German       
and Italian as its official languages, these being the         
languages of the first six countries to join the         
organization.  (EU Commission)’ 
 
‘The ​regulation listing official languages of the EU        
would have to be changed unanimously by       
remaining countries if they want to keep English as         
an official language’ 
‘The Commission has already started using French       
and German more often in its external       
communications, as a symbolic move after Britain       
voted to leave the EU’ 
 
The future of English in the EU after Brexit? 
 
It was observed in sections III and IV, particularly since the EU expanded into              
Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, that English has been slowly and steadily increasing its             
influence while edging out both French and German to become the most dominant             
language of the EU even to the dismay and protest of others, notably, the French . So,                87
will English remain the EU’s de facto official language now that the UK is leaving the                
EU? In other words, could ‘Brexit’ actually threaten the dominant status of the English              
language especially within the EU institutions? The answer is No, Not Really, and Except              
- depending on how things unfold.  
First, since English is already the most commonly understood foreign language in the              
EU, the one learned by most young Europeans as a second language, and the most widely                
87 Considering the fact that the EU institutions were located in predominantly Franco-German 
speaking cities of Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg.   
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spoken language in the world, it is most likely to retain its current status and influence in                 
the EU regardless of happened next. So, considered from this overall reality, the answer              
is no, Brexit would not threaten the dominant status of the language in the EU. 
Second, if at least one country identifying English as its official language chooses to               
remain in the EU, this would help maintain unaffected the language’s current official             
status and political legitimacy. So, viewed from this possibility, the answer is not really,              
Brexit would not threaten the official position of the language in the EU. 
And third, now that the UK will activate Article 50 of dissociation, English will likely                
not be one of the block’s official languages since it was Britain alone in the EU which                 
had identified it as an EU official language (Ireland having declared Gaelic as its EU               
official language). It could lose its official status as soon as Britain leaves the EU -                
especially if there is no EU-wide desire and political will to keep the language and its de                 
facto current state. In fact, there is the possibility that the French and the Germans whose                
languages were the most affected by the rise of English dominance would instead seek a               
more assertive approach in promoting their languages - either or both as a gradual              
replacement to English. But since any change to the EU’s language policy to drop              
English from the current regime would itself require a unanimous vote from all Council              
of Ministers whose most common language is English, the EU could simply decide to              
leave it as a working language with or without official status but take measures that limits                
its influence in the organization in accordance with the Franco-German wishes. So,            
considered from an EU without the UK, the answer is English is likely to remain               
functional except if the Council wants an EU without English. English is, in fact, the               
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language of the European Central Bank even though the UK remained out of the              
Schengen visa-free travel area or the eurozone - and is likely to play the same role in the                  
Eu even without UK membership. 
P1 . The real problems of replacing English in the EU  88
Since the UK’s vote leave the EU, the debate over the future place of the English                 
language in Europe has intensified with some suggesting that the EU would have no              
English as an official language in its future.  
However, there are two major problems to encounter in any effort aimed at              
diminishing, edging out, or replacing English with either French or German in the EU.              
First, as David Crystal and others have noted, the English language remains the most              
useful global language of our time because of its unmatched international roles and             
functions. It is the only language which enjoys a privileged position in the multilingual              
society of the 21st century, appearing in the language mix in every part of the world                
including the EU, according to Graddol (1997:63). To try to eject it out of the EU                
language mix would, therefore, require complicated steps and political decisions. 
Secondly, as Kachru (1990:98) and others have also pointed out, the planning for the               
spread of the language has already passed into the hands of its non-native users even in                
the EU, and therefore, any efforts to try to reverse, hamper, or remove it out of the                 
language mix in the EU would require extraordinary difficulties at this stage. As we have               
noted in Sections III and IV, the education systems of most EU Member States are, in                
88 P = postscript sub-header 
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fact, so highly geared toward teaching English as the first foreign language that even              
Brexit is less likely to change the position of the language in the EU.  
P2.The future of English and why the EU may have no other options  
David Graddol, commissioned by the British Council in 1997, published ‘The Future             
of English?’ to forecast future use and learning of the English language worldwide and              
the potential benefits for UK native speakers. Using the language’s legacy of history,             
current status, and global trends, he concluded that “no single language will occupy the              
monopolistic position in the 21st century which English has - almost - achieved by the               
end of the 20th century” (p. 59). Below is an index score he used showing the ranking of                  
‘global influence’ of the 12 major languages according to an Engco model analysis that              
incorporates, among other variables, the economic and cultural power of a language’s            
native speakers. 
1. English                    100  89
2. German                     42 
3. French                       33 
4. Japanese                    32 
5. Spanish                      31 
6. Chinese                      22 
7. Arabic                        8 
8. Portuguese                 5 
9. Malay                         4 
10. Russian                       3 
11. Hindi/Urdu                 0.4 
12. Bengali                       0.09 
Table 7  
89 ‘An index score of 100 represents the position of English in 1995.’  
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According to him, “Chinese, Hindi/Urdu, Spanish, and Arabic may join English” at the             
top as most influential global languages while “French and the other OECD languages             
(German, Japanese) are likely to decline in status” (1997: 59). In other words, “English              
will remain pre-eminent for some time, but it will eventually become one language             
amongst many” (1997:61). This finding is useful in that it helps us see why the EU is                 
likely to proceed with English in post-Brexit Europe because the language is so deeply              
ingrained in the EU at this stage for any change to be feasible or desirable. In fact,                 
English already accounts for more than 80% of all new internally drafted legislative             
proposals, according to some estimates. This is because, English’s two main EU            90
challenger languages, French and German, both face imminent retreat or decline in their             
share of global influence in the future. 
Also, though at present all EU citizens enjoy the right to freely live and work in other                  
EU countries without legal requirements to speak any country’s languages in order to do              
so, and though UK citizens not only would have to apply for visas to travel within the EU                  
area but also may be required to meet any language policy requirements for living and               
working in an EU country such as Germany or France, however, the fact that English               
would continue being the lingua franca for most EU citizens means that the EU may have                
no better option but to keep it in the EU language mix even after Brexit. 
Obviously, with Brexit not just the sociolinguistic aspect but the whole integration is              
being tested - but again, exactly, it is going to proceed as the theories predict it will -                  
MORE EU and not less. An EU country, under the treaties, accepts all the ‘Four               
90 More than that, the English translation is and will remain the most go-to document for the majority 
of officials wanting access to other documents not in their own languages regardless of their 
nationality 
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Freedoms’: the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people. No country             
is exempted to pick and choose out of the four which ones it wants to opt out on and                   
which ones it wants to keep. Apparently, the UK wants to keep the first 3 freedoms of                 
movement of goods, services, and capital but not people. It wants the benefits that come               
with the 3 freedoms but not the responsibility or cost that accompany the 4th freedom -                
the movement of people . That is going to be the complication in the negotiations on               91
Article 50 that might bring it back into EU AGAIN. It would not be surprising if the UK,                  
failing to get a "special" exit ideal package, re-applies to remain in the EU sooner than we                 
can see - giving English keep the political cover it needs. 
Conclusion 
Some basic facts about languages and the English language in Europe: 
 
● The EU has 24 ​official and working languages of which French, German, and             
English are the recognized working languages in its institutions’ executive arm -            
not a surprising as they are also the languages of the block’s three largest              
economies. 
● The EU has fewer official languages than the Member States because some            
members share common languages. 
● English is one of the 24 EU official languages because of UK which identified it               
as its official language which 13% of EU citizens speak as their native language.              
It is spoken by ninety-eight percent of UK residents as a first language. 
● English is one of or the official languages of Great Britain, the Republic of               
Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Malta, Gibraltar, Jersey, Guernsey,         
and the Isle of Man. 
● French and German are each spoken by 14% while Spanish and Russian at 6%              
each, and Italian at 3% of the European population. 
● Scandinavian countries have the highest working knowledge of English.  
● Keeping English post-Brexit could make communications in the EU fairer since           
most of those speaking it would be using a foreign language. 
91 Ironically, it is the UK’s educational policy towards promoting its language that goes to explain 
why it is the English-speaking countries of the UK and Ireland that are also the migrant destination 
for Europeans able to function better in English than in other EU languages. 
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● English could or will remain a working language in the EU though it may not               
remain an official language. 
● English is the world global lingua franca, the most commonly spoken foreign            
language in 19 out of 25 EU countries - with nearly half of EU citizens who claim                 
to have sufficient conversational skills in it. 
 
These facts constitute the factors generating some of the sociolinguistic dynamics             





















The Notes is a short list of some basic ‘terms’ or ‘concepts’ used in this paper. 
  
The evolutionary approach​: the diachronic progression of societies from simple to           
complex 
  
Theories: ‘a coherent group of tested general propositions, commonly regarded as           
correct, that can be used as principles of explanation and prediction for a class of               
phenomena.’ 
  
Variables: they are events or things that can vary or change in value or characteristics in                
ways that can be measured. A variable can independent, dependent, or precedent. The             
measure of how much two or more variables change together is their ‘covariance’. 
  
Politics ​- ‘the making of decisions by public means’ - Karl Deutsch 
  
A political system​: ‘a coordinated set of principles, laws, ideas, and procedures relating             
to a particular form [or arrangement] of government.’ 
  
European integration: the process of the political, economic, sociocultural, and the legal            
integration of states and peoples in Europe. Unless specified such as economic            
integration or political integration that are restricted to integration within their spheres,            
the term ‘integration’ refers to total process of European integration. 
  
Dynamism:​ ‘the quality of being characterized by vigorous activity and progress’ 
  
Spillover effects: ‘they are the political, economic, and other events that occur in one              
context because of something else in a seemingly unrelated context had occurred. They             
are secondary effects that follow from a primary effect though may be removed in time or                
place from the primary events themselves.’ 
  
Neofunctionalists: ​theorists who ‘maintained that the unintended consequences of         
integration, once launched, would be self-reinforcing.’  ~  Andrew Moravcsik 
 
Spheres / domains: as applied here, the two words are more or less interchangeable to               
the mean, distinct areas of analysis, activity, or control. In the sociolinguistic sphere or              
domain, the area also encompasses sub-domains as language acquisition, pragmatism,          
multilingualism, contact linguistics, etc. 
124 
 
Micro vs. macro analysis​: ​micro analysts analyze the individual, the smallest units of             
interaction within a system while macro analysts focus on the system itself or the ‘big               
picture.’ 
  
Levels of analysis: are levels of abstraction or generalization that isolate a particular             
level for analysis from its complex whole. In Europe, it may be individual, the Member               
states, or the EU itself. In this paper, the EU is the level of analysis 
  
Linguistic diversity: ​the existence of more than one language  in a country, region, 
 
Mutual intelligibility: the degree of mutual understanding that people may have based            
on how close their languages are or perceived to be related or similar to one another such                 
as Norwegian and Danish or Spanish and Italian. 
  
Multilingualism: ‘can refer to either the language use or the competence of an individual              
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